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INTRODUCTION 
n 1934, Oregon amended its Constitution to allow, “that in the circuit 
court ten members of the jury may render a verdict of guilty or not 
guilty, save and except a verdict of guilty for first degree murder, which 
shall be found only by unanimous verdict.”1 Oregon became the second 
 
1 OR. CONST. art I, § 11. Passage of the amendment inserted the following language just 
before the period at the end of article I, section 11: 
[P]rovided, however, that any accused person, in other than capital cases, and with 
the consent of the trial judge, may elect to waive trial by jury and consent to be 
tried by the judge of the court alone, such election to be in writing; provided, 
however, that in the circuit court ten members of the jury may render a verdict of 
guilty or not guilty, save and except a verdict of guilty of first degree murder, 
which shall be found only by a unanimous verdict, and not otherwise[.] 
As originally ratified, article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution stated: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to public trial by an 
impartial jury in the county in which the offense shall have been committed; to be 
heard by himself and counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, and to have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses face to face, and to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. 
OR. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 11. 
I 
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state, after Louisiana, to allow nonunanimous juries in criminal cases. 
Louisiana’s “Majority Rule,” passed in 1880, three years after 
Reconstruction when white landowners sought to replace black slave 
labor.2 The new law allowed juries to convict defendants without a 
unanimous vote and was deliberately designed to create more convicts 
to increase the labor force.3 Making convictions easier meant more 
prisoners, especially freed blacks, and more prisoners meant more labor 
to lease for profit.4 Passed some fifty-four years later and under 
different circumstances, Oregon’s history is also shameful.5 Oregon’s 
law was a reaction to the notorious trial of Jacob Silverman, which took 
place after a state simmering with anti-immigrant xenophobia 
(predominantly anti-Semitism and anti-Catholicism) became outraged 
when a twelve-person jury unanimously convicted Silverman of 
manslaughter rather than first-degree murder in a case involving the 
death of Jimmy Walker.6 Oregonians became angry that a Jewish man 
accused of killing a Protestant was spared a murder conviction and 
death sentence because a single juror held out for manslaughter. While 
this reaction may be surprising to today’s Oregonians, it is important 
to understand the historical context at the time. 
 
2 Marjorie R. Esman, Nonunanimous Jury Verdicts Steeped in Racist Past, THE 
ADVOCATE (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/opinion/our_views 
/article_e9fefca4-c278-57f6-a0fa-24eb1c93d2fd.html. 
3 THOMAS AIELLO, JIM CROW’S LAST STAND: NONUNANIMOUS JURY VERDICTS IN 
LOUISIANA 12 (2015). Three years after the end of the civil war, the leasing of convict labor 
was privatized in Louisiana in 1868. Id. at 10. Southern economies depended on cotton, and 
convict labor made production more affordable. See Inequality and the Punishment of Minor 
Offenders in the Early 20th Century, 27 L. & SOC’Y REV. 313, 314−15 (1993). Lessees of 
convict labor lobbied to change criminal laws to increase the availability of young black 
men. Ahmed A. White, Rule of Law and the Limits of Sovereignty: The Private Prison in 
Jurisprudential Perspective, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111, 128–29 (2001). 
4 AIELLO, supra note 3, at 12. 
5 James Kachmar, Silencing the Minority: Permitting Nonunanimous Jury Verdicts in 
Criminal Trials, 28 PAC. L.J. 273, 278 (1996) (noting the passage of the amendment 
allowing nonunanimous verdicts to the Oregon Constitution in 1934). 
6 For a good read about the passing of Oregon’s statute, see Clayton M. Tullos, Non-
Unanimous Jury Trials in Oregon, OCDLA LIBRARY OF DEFENSE (Sept. 29, 2014), 
https://libraryofdefense.ocdla.org/Blog:Main/Non-Unanimous_Jury_Trials_in_Oregon. 
Eleven of the twelve jurors wanted to convict on a second-degree murder charge 
and one wanted to acquit. A second-degree murder charge would have resulted in 
a statutory sentence of life in jail. Instead of forcing a mistrial and likely 
subsequent repeat trial the jurors compromised, after nearly seventeen hours of 
deliberation, with a sentence of manslaughter. 
Id. “In the 1930s a manslaughter sentence allowed for significant judicial discretion; the 
judge could sentence anywhere from one to fifteen years and a maximum fine of $5000.” 
Id. (citing OR. CODE ANN. § 14-213 (1930)). 
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The late 1920s and early 1930s found Oregon deep in recession and 
caught up in “the growing menace of organized crime and the bigotry 
and fear of minority groups.”7 This followed more than a decade of a 
powerful Ku Klux Klan8 that was welcomed by an overwhelmingly 
white, native-born, and Protestant society. A society where “[r]acism, 
religious bigotry, and anti-immigrant sentiments were deeply 
entrenched in the laws, culture, and social life.”9 This was the backdrop 
during Silverman’s 1934 murder trial. 
The State charged Jacob Silverman with first-degree murder for the 
fatal shooting of Jimmy Walker, who was suspected of shooting 
Silverman’s friend.10 The bodies of both Jimmy Walker and Edith 
McClain were discovered on a Saturday morning in April of 1933.11 
The police arrested Silverman that same afternoon.12 At trial, witnesses 
testified to seeing a man resembling Silverman get into a car with a 
small woman and three men.13 The State theorized that one of these 
three men shot Walker and McClain and that Silverman aided and 
abetted in that crime by driving the vehicle.14 
The local newspaper, The Morning Oregonian, immersed the trial in 
publicity, reporting on everything from questions asked by the defense 
in voir dire,15 to testimony of the State’s witnesses at trial,16 and even 
the evidence that ultimately convinced the majority of the jury—
“plaster of paris casts taken April 22 of tire tracks found close to the 
bodies . . . admitted over the strenuous and heated objection” of the 
defense.17 Despite this, a lone “holdout” juror—perhaps not convinced 
 
7 AIELLO, supra note 3, at 39. 
8 In 1922 the Klan in Oregon boasted membership of over 14,000 men, with 9000 of 
them living in Portland. And they were setting the state aflame. There were frequent cross 
burnings on the hills outside Portland and around greater Oregon. AIELLO, supra note 3, at 
39; Michael J. Nove, Deliver Us from Evil, OR. STATE BAR BULL., 1996, at 37–38. 
9 Eckhard Toy, Ku Klux Klan, THE OR. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://oregonencyclopedia.org 
/articles/ku_klux_klan/#.Vx_mZGOePJo (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
10 Tullos, supra note 6, at 21. 
11 State v. Silverman, 148 Or. 296, 297 (1934). 
12 Id. at 299. 
13 Id. at 301. 
14 Id. at 303–04. 
15 Silverman Trial Begins, THE MORNING OREGONIAN, Oct. 31, 1933. 
16 Herbert S. Lampman, Witness Says Car Driven by Accused, THE MORNING 
OREGONIAN, Nov. 7, 1933. 
17 Silverman Guilty of Manslaughter, THE MORNING OREGONIAN, Nov. 17, 1933. 
Interestingly, today, “impression evidence” like the cast of tire tracks might be repudiated 
as “junk science,” one of many factors contributing to wrongful convictions. See Sabra 
Thomas, Comment, Addressing Wrongful Convictions: An Examination of Texas’s New 
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beyond a reasonable doubt by the State’s evidence—did not wish to 
convict Silverman for first-degree murder.18 The jury returned a verdict 
of manslaughter, and the holdout juror unwittingly became the poster 
child for Oregon Ballot No. 302-03.19 
Less than a month after Silverman’s sentencing for manslaughter, 
where he received three years in prison and a $1000 fine, far less time 
than the maximum sentence due,20 the Oregon Legislature proposed a 
constitutional amendment allowing nonunanimous verdicts to be voted 
upon in the 1934 Special Election.21 In describing the new ballot 
measure, The Morning Oregonian published that “the Silverman case 
in Oregon and the epidemic of lynchings elsewhere came at exactly the 
right time to bring unprecedented pressure to bear upon the 
legislature.”22 Another article opined that “Americans have learned, 
with some pain, that many peoples in the world are unfit for democratic 
institutions, lacking the traditions of the English-speaking peoples.”23 
The author then pointed to a “mixed murder jury” in Honolulu that 
demonstrated a “complete lack of a sense of responsibility,” in its 
failure to convict a non-white defendant.24 
The Morning Oregonian further espoused that “no person’s rights 
can conceivably be impaired by the decision of ten out of twelve 
jurors,” and implied that corrupt jurors might be the cause of hung 
juries.25 Other editorials decried the “increased urbanization of 
American life,” stating that “the vast immigration into America from 
southern and eastern Europe, of people untrained in the jury system, 
have combined to make the jury of twelve increasingly unwieldy and 
unsatisfactory.”26 This represents the type of rhetoric that flooded the 
 
Junk Science Writ and Other Measures for Protecting the Innocent, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1037, 
1039–46 (2015). 
18 P.J. STADELMAN, SECRETARY OF STATE, OFFICIAL REPUBLICAN VOTER’S PAMPHLET 
7 (May 18, 1934). 
19 Id. 
20 The judge in the case said, “[m]ore convincing evidence would be necessary to justify 
a severe sentence.” Tullos, supra note 6. 
21 Id. 
22 Jury Reform Up to Voters, THE MORNING OREGONIAN, Dec. 11, 1933. In December 
of 1933 the Oregon Legislature held a special second session that introduced Senate Joint 
Resolution 4 to amend the Oregon Constitution. Id. 
23 Debauchery of Boston Juries, THE MORNING OREGONIAN, Nov. 3, 1933. 
24 Id. 
25 Tullos, supra note 6; see also Verdicts by Ten, THE MORNING OREGONIAN, Mar. 27, 
1934. 
26 One Juror Against Eleven, THE MORNING OREGONIAN, Nov. 25, 1933. 
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public discourse before Oregonians voted on Ballot No. 302-03 to 
allow nonunanimous jury verdicts in criminal cases. 
The relevant part of the Voter Pamphlet explained the measure like 
this: 
The proposed constitutional amendment is to prevent one or two 
jurors from controlling the verdict or causing a disagreement. The 
amendment has been endorsed by the district attorney’s association 
of this state and is approved by the commission appointed by the 
governor to make recommendations amending criminal procedure. 
Disagreements not only place the taxpayers to the expense of retrial 
which may again result in another disagreement, but congest the trial 
docket of the courts . . . . Disagreements occasioned by one or two 
jurors refusing to agree with 10 or 11 other jurors is a frequent 
occurrence. One unreasonable juror of the 12, or one not 
understanding the instructions of the court can prevent a verdict 
either of guilt or innocence.27 
This “unreasonable juror” theory faced no organized opposition, and it 
explicitly invoked State v. Silverman as an example of one juror forcing 
a compromise.28 The only argument against the amendment discussed 
higher pay for district attorneys (who supported the measure) as an 
alternative to passing an amendment that would make it easier for the 
State to convict criminal defendants.29 The proposed amendment to the 
Oregon Constitution allowing 10–2 verdicts passed, with 46,745 votes 
for the amendment and 27,988 against.30 Ballot No. 302-03 and its 
passage was a direct result of the Silverman case and the socio-political 
climate at the time. 
Today, Oregon and Louisiana remain the only two states that permit 
convictions on less-than-unanimous jury verdicts, 10–2, in non-first-
degree murder criminal cases.31 All other states and the federal 
government require that jurors reach a verdict unanimously. 
 
27 Stadelman, supra note 18, at 7. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 8 (discussing “adequate compensation” for district attorneys overburdened with 
cases). 
30 Official Counts Issued, THE MORNING OREGONIAN, June 1, 1934. By comparison, 
368,808 Oregonians voted in the 1932 Presidential election just two years earlier. See U.S. 
ELECTION ATLAS, Oregon Results for 1932, http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/compare 
.php?year=1932&fips=41&f=0&off=0&elect=0&type=state&all=1 (last visited Feb. 5, 
2017). This indicates that around only twenty percent of Oregon voters voted on the 
proposed change to the Oregon Constitution. 
31 OR. CONST. art. I, § 11; OR. REV. STAT. § 136.450(1) (2015); LA. CONST. art. I, § 17 
(requiring the concurrence of at least 10 of 12 jurors in criminal matters); see also State v. 
Bertrand, 6 So. 3d 738, 743 (La. 2009) (upholding the constitutionality of nonunanimous 
verdicts); State ex rel. Smith v. Sawyer, 501 P.2d 792, 793 (Or. 1972) (same). Note that 
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In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court recognized that the right 
to a jury trial in criminal cases, enshrined in the Sixth Amendment,32 
is a fundamental right to be incorporated against the states by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.33 The Court recognized the purpose of the 
jury trial was  “to prevent oppression by the Government.”34 Criminal 
convictions were to “be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve 
of [the defendant’s] equals and neighbours.”35 Indeed, when the Court 
recognized the incorporation of the right to a jury trial, it assumed 
unanimity and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to 
be characteristics of the Sixth Amendment criminal jury trial.36 
Nonetheless, just four years later, in Apodaca v. Oregon, a plurality 
of Justices concluded that the Sixth Amendment does not mandate 
unanimity in state jury trials.37 Remarkably, Apodaca was a fractured 
4–1–4 decision where both groups of four Justices agreed that the rule 
should be the same for federal and state trials.38 Four Justices found 
unanimity not constitutionally required in either federal or state trials.39 
Four Justices found that unanimity is a constitutional guarantee in both 
 
Oklahoma uses nonunanimous verdicts, but only in misdemeanor trials, and thirty-four 
states allow nonunanimous verdicts in civil trials. 
32 The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
33 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
34 Id. at 155. 
35 Id. at 152 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 343 (1769)). 
36 See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896) (stating “[t]he very object of the 
jury system is to secure unanimity by a comparison of views, and by arguments of the jurors 
themselves”); Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 535 (1905) (assuming a criminal 
conviction by a nonunanimous jury was not in compliance with the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288–90 (1930) (discussing unanimity 
as a required and essential element of a trial by jury in a criminal case); In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358, 364, 367 (1970) (holding that all elements of a crime must be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, regardless of whether the defendant is tried as an adult or a juvenile). 
37 Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). 
38 Id. at 411–14 (plurality) (finding that unanimity is not “constitutionally essential to the 
continued operation of the jury system” and therefore is not applicable against the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment); id. at 414 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that the 
Sixth Amendment jury trial clearly guarantees a unanimous verdict); Johnson v. Louisiana, 
406 U.S. 356, 369 (Powell, J., concurring in Apodaca) (stating that the Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial need not “be identical in every detail to the concept required in federal 
courts”). 
39 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 406 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Blackmun, J., and 
Rehnquist, J.). 
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federal and state trials.40 One concurring Justice, Justice Powell, 
determined that while history mandated unanimity in federal criminal 
trials, this same protection did not extend to state criminal trials.41 In 
recent years, however, the Court has acknowledged that the “Sixth 
Amendment right to trial by jury requires a unanimous jury verdict.”42 
The Court’s reaffirmation of an incorporation approach to Bill of 
Rights protections, its commitment to reasonable doubt, and current 
research indicating that nonunanimous verdicts may affect jury 
deliberations and public confidence in the criminal justice system, 
seriously undermines the reasoning in Apodaca. Yet, Justice Lewis 
Powell believed otherwise and, as the swing vote, his position defined 
the law. 
This Article argues that criminal convictions in state courts should 
be subject to the same unanimity requirements that the Sixth 
Amendment imposes on federal criminal convictions. Part I of this 
Article provides an overview of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on jury size and nonunanimity. Part I includes a 
discussion of Apodaca v. Oregon and Johnson v. Louisiana, the Court’s 
1972 decisions holding that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments did 
not require jury unanimity in state court criminal jury trials even though 
federal law requires that federal juries must reach criminal verdicts 
unanimously.43 This is followed by a summary of many of the recently 
denied certiorari petitions that have pressed the Court to reconsider the 
jury unanimity issue in light of changing Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence and social science evidence. Part II explains how the 
Court’s recent jurisprudence contradicts its 1972 Apodaca and Johnson 
rulings under the doctrine of incorporation. Specifically, applying the 
Court’s 2010 McDonald v. City of Chicago incorporation approach to 
Oregon’s and Louisiana’s nonunanimous jury law signifies that 
overturning Apodaca should be easy, and in fact indicates that the 
Court should incorporate the few unincorporated provisions of the Bill 
of Rights. In addition to the incorporation doctrine, Part III argues that 
nonunanimous verdicts undermine the reasonable doubt requirement of 
 
40 Id. at 414 (Stewart, J., joined by Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting); Johnson, 
406 U.S. at 380 (Douglas, J., joined by Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting). 
41 Johnson, 406 U.S. at 369 (Powell, J., concurring in Apodaca). 
42 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 766 n.14 (2010); see Blakeley v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (“[T]he ‘truth of every accusation’ against a 
defendant ‘should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his 
equals and neighbours.’”) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND 343 (1769)). 
43 Apodaca, 406 U.S. 404; Johnson, 406 U.S. 356. 
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the right to a jury trial and that the Court’s own case law prior to and 
since Apodaca and Johnson confirms this right to unanimity, which 
ensures that the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a 
component has been met. Part IV sets forth the current research that 
shows that unanimity is essential to the purposes of the fair cross 
section and complete deliberation requirements of the Sixth 
Amendment. Part V addresses how nonunanimous verdicts contribute 
to convicting innocent defendants, and Part VI discusses how 
nonunanimous verdicts disproportionally affect both minority jurors 
and minority defendants in Oregon. Finally, this Article concludes by 
recommending that the Supreme Court overturn Apodaca v. Oregon, 
as the law and current research supports that unanimous juries should 
be required in all criminal cases. Moreover, even if the Supreme Court 
does not act, Oregon’s citizenry and Legislature should support 
amending the state constitution to abolish majority verdicts in all 
criminal cases. Such an amendment would serve to protect innocent 
defendants and end a rule that was founded to silence minority 
viewpoints. 
I 
SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON JURY SIZE AND 
NONUNANIMITY 
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court came up with a number of 
seemingly random rules about what constitutes a legal jury trial under 
the Sixth Amendment. The Court ruled, for example, that a jury of six 
is constitutional44 but a jury of five is not.45 The Court also ruled that 
in a jury of six, the conviction must be unanimous,46 but in a jury of 
twelve (in state court but not federal court), the conviction does not 
have to be unanimous.47 After abandoning the historic roots defining 
the jury system, the Supreme Court struggled to delineate the 
constitutional jury requirements in the 1970s. In a series of sparsely 
reasoned opinions, the Court divined both the quantity of jurors and the 
proportion of guilty votes that the Constitution required to sustain a 
criminal conviction. Of course, the size of the jury and the requirement 
 
44 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 85 (1970). 
45 Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 243 (1978). 
46 Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 134 (1979). 
47 Johnson, 406 U.S. at 362; Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 414. At the time of these decisions, 
Louisiana required a 9–3 vote to convict in noncapital cases, which the court upheld as 
constitutional. The state has since changed its threshold to 10−2. LA. CONST. art. I, § 17. 
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of unanimity are intimately linked. Allowing majority rather than 
unanimous jury decisions has the functional effect of reducing jury 
size, and thus some of the same concerns about jury size apply to 
nonunanimous juries.48 Hence, no discussion about nonunanimous 
juries would be appropriate without first discussing the law with regard 
to jury size. 
A. Permissible Jury Sizes 
In 1970, in Williams v. Florida, the defendant-petitioner challenged 
a Florida statute allowing six-person juries in state criminal cases.49 
Williams argued that the statute was inconsistent with the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of trial by jury.50 Abandoning hundreds of years 
of common-law precedent,51 the Supreme Court ruled that six-person 
juries were constitutional.52 Because the Sixth Amendment does not 
discuss the number of jurors required, the Court examined whether a 
twelve-person jury was a constitutional necessity of trial by jury, 
finding that “the 12-man [sic] panel is not a necessary ingredient of 
‘trial by jury’” and in fact constituted nothing more than an “historical 
accident.”53 The Court determined that, historically, “the essential 
feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition between the accused 
and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen.”54 
The jury’s role, the Court continued, is “to prevent oppression by the 
Government,” specifically, “‘the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and 
against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.’”55 But, as it 
 
48 Justice Douglas’s dissent in Johnson observed that getting rid of the unanimity 
requirement diminishes verdict reliability just like smaller juries because, “nonunanimous 
juries need not debate and deliberate as fully as must unanimous juries.” Johnson, 406. U.S. 
at 388 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
49 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
50 Id. at 80. 
51 Id. at 122–24 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Until Williams, the 
Court had defined jury to mean a twelve-person jury. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 
145 (1968) (applying the Sixth Amendment to the states and holding that state criminal 
prosecutions of non-petty offenses required twelve-person juries). 
52 Williams, 399 U.S. at 86. 
53 Id. at 86–89. Justice Harlan criticized the Court for determining that twelve persons 
“is a historical accident—even though one that has recurred without interruption since the 
14th century–and is in no way essential to the ‘purpose of the jury trial’. . . .” Baldwin v. 
New York, 399 U.S. 119, 125 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting and concurring). Justice 
Marshall similarly criticized the Court’s departure from “an unbroken line of precedent 
going back over 70 years.” Williams, 399 U.S. at 117 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). 
54 Williams, 399 U.S. at 101. 
55 Id. at 100 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)). 
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explained, preventing oppression by the Government “is not a function 
of the particular number” of jurors.56 
To support its decision, the Court referenced “a ‘functional analysis’ 
[or functional equivalence test] of the performance of smaller juries 
(that is, empirical examination of the behavior of different-sized 
juries).”57 This functional analysis or functional equivalence test, as the 
Court explained, “must be the function that the particular feature 
performs and its relation to the purposes of the jury trial.”58 The Court 
looked at various purposes of the jury and analyzed whether smaller 
juries could perform those functions as well as twelve-person juries.59 
It noted that the size “should probably be large enough to promote 
group deliberation, free from outside attempts at intimidation, and to 
provide a fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of 
the community.”60 According to Professor Michael Saks, “[t]he Court 
relied on (1) what it claimed were empirical studies (specifically: 
‘experiments’) but which were not, in fact, empirical studies; (2) actual 
studies, the findings of which the Court read exactly backwards; and 
(3) its own speculation.”61 As this description indicates, the Court’s 
decision in Williams generated considerable criticism along with new 
research from both legal and scientific scholars.62 In fact, Hans Zeisel, 
whose work the Court cited in Williams to support its conclusion,63 
stated that his “findings were quite different” from the Court’s 
interpretation.64 He also explained that the other studies the Court 
relied on provided “scant evidence by any standards” for the Court’s 




57 Alisa Smith & Michael J. Saks, The Case for Overturning Williams v. Florida and the 
Six-Person Jury: History, Law, and Empirical Evidence, 60 FLA. L. REV. 441, 441 (2008). 
58 Williams, 399 U.S. at 99–100. 
59 See id. at 100–01. 
60 Id. at 100. 
61 Smith & Saks, supra note 57, at 455. For a detailed criticism, see id. 
62 See, e.g., Joan B. Kessler, Note, An Empirical Study of Six- and Twelve-Member Jury 
Decision-Making Processes, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 712 (1973); William R. Pabst, Jr., 
Statistical Studies of the Cost of Six-Man Versus Twelve-Man Juries, 14 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 326 (1972); Hans Zeisel, . . . And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the 
Federal Jury, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1971). 
63 Williams, 399 U.S. at 101 n.49 (citing HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE 
AMERICAN JURY 462–63, 488–89 (1966)). 
64 Zeisel, supra note 62, at 719. 
65 Id. at 715. 
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While the Williams Court did not directly address the issue of jury 
unanimity, “in holding that a six-person jury would suffice for a state 
trial, [it] found that the necessary consequence of the decision is that 
twelve-member juries are not constitutionally mandated in federal 
criminal trials either,” and it further “noted that a six-person jury can 
fulfill the constitutionally mandated duties and purposes of a jury just 
as well as a twelve-person jury, ‘particularly if the requirement for 
unanimity was retained.’”66 Just two years later, the Court again 
overturned hundreds of years of precedent and tradition. Instead of 
relying on the functional analysis, reasoning, and empirical studies 
from Williams, the Court held that the Constitution permits 
nonunanimous juries in state criminal trials.67 
B. Nonunanimous Jury Verdicts in State Court 
1. Clarifying Apodaca v. Oregon and Johnson v. Louisiana 
The Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of nonunanimous 
juries on May 22, 1972, ruling on two cases: Johnson v. Louisiana68 
and Apodaca v. Oregon.69  In Johnson v. Louisiana, the defendant 
challenged his robbery conviction by a 9–3 verdict as unconstitutional 
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, asserting that “guilt cannot be said to have been proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt when one or more of a jury’s members at 
the conclusion of deliberation still possesses such a doubt.”70 A 
majority of the Court found that “the disagreement of three jurors does 
not alone establish reasonable doubt,” in the face of a substantial 
 
66 Kate Riordan, Ten Angry Men: Unanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Trials and 
Incorporation After McDonald, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1403, 1409 (2011). 
67 Since Williams, the Supreme Court has not addressed a direct challenge to the six-
person jury. In Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), abandoning the functional 
equivalence test, the Court held that a Georgia state statute authorizing criminal conviction 
upon the unanimous vote of a jury of five was unconstitutional. And in Burch v. Louisiana, 
441 U.S. 130 (1979), the Court found Louisiana’s law that allowed criminal convictions on 
5–1 votes by a six-person jury violated the Sixth Amendment. Ironically, the Court in Burch 
looked to “the near-uniform judgment of the Nation . . . in delimiting the line between those 
jury practices that are constitutionally permissible and those that are not.” Id. at 138. 
Ostensibly, if the Court had employed this same reasoning in Apodaca five years earlier, 
addressing nonunanimous verdicts in only two states, there would not be a need for this 
Article. 
68 406 U.S. 356 (1972). 
69 406 U.S. 404 (1972). 
70 Johnson, 406 U.S. at 356–60. 
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majority of jurors voting to convict.71 The Court found it likely that 
nine jurors finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt would only outvote 
a minority when that minority “continue[d] to insist upon acquittal 
without having persuasive reasons in support of its position,” 
essentially buying into the “unreasonable juror” theory that led to 
Oregon’s constitutional amendment.72 Inherent in this reasoning is the 
assumption that allowing nonunanimous verdicts would not affect the 
thoroughness of jury deliberation, and consequently, the accuracy of 
the verdict. 
Justice Harry Blackmun joined in the Court’s opinion and judgment 
but wrote separately to question the wisdom of the “split-verdict 
system.”73 Justice Powell authored a concurring opinion, noting that 
Johnson was prevented from using the “fundamental fairness” 
language of Duncan because Duncan did not apply retroactively.74 
Four Justices dissented. Justices William Douglas, William Brennan, 
Potter Stewart, and Thurgood Marshall dissented in an opinion 
applying to both Apodaca and Johnson.75 Justice Stewart wrote that 
“the Fourteenth Amendment alone clearly requires that if a State 
purports to accord the right of trial by jury in a criminal case, then only 
a unanimous jury can return a constitutionally valid verdict.”76 
In sum, Duncan incorporated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial for criminal defendants, Johnson decided whether the “reasonable 
doubt” standard required unanimous verdicts under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and Apodaca, issued the same day as Johnson, addressed 
whether a state defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial 
included the right to a unanimous verdict. 
Even though Johnson and Apodaca dealt with similar issues at 
approximately the same time, Apodaca resulted in a fractured plurality 
opinion.77 In Apodaca, three Oregon defendants challenged their 
 
71 Id. at 362. 
72 Id. at 361–62. 
73 Id. at 365–66 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
74 Id. at 367 (Powell, J., concurring). In 1968, the Court held in Duncan that the Sixth 
Amendment right to a trial by jury in a criminal case was “among those ‘fundamental 
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political 
institutions’” and it incorporated that right against the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148. 
75 Id. at 380 (Douglas, J., with whom Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., concur, dissenting) 
(stating that the opinion also applies to No. 69-5046, Apodaca et al. v. Oregon, post, p. 404). 
76 Id. at 397. 
77 See supra note 40 (explaining the division of Justices in Apodaca). 
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convictions of burglary, grand larceny, and assault by a deadly weapon 
by less than unanimous jury verdicts.78 Two of the defendants were 
convicted by jury verdicts of 11–1 and the third defendant by a 10–2 
jury verdict.79 
The petitioner-defendants reasoned that “a Sixth Amendment ‘jury 
trial’ made mandatory on the States by virtue of the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . require[s] a unanimous jury verdict 
in order to give substance to the reasonable-doubt standard otherwise 
mandated by the Due Process Clause.”80 The petitioner-defendants also 
maintained that nonunanimous verdicts would undermine the 
Fourteenth Amendment requirement that the jury “reflect a cross 
section of the community,” by allowing the majority to reach a decision 
without considering the arguments of a minority member.81 
In each of the three cases addressed in Apodaca, the juries took less 
than fifty-one minutes to assemble in the jury room, elect a foreman, 
deliberate, and inform the court of its verdict.82 While the State 
recognized full jury deliberation as an “essential ingredient[] of trial by 
jury guaranteed by the Constitution,” it advocated for a minimum 
deliberation period of two hours before acceptance of a nonunanimous 
jury verdict to ensure adequate deliberation.83 The Supreme Court, 
however, did not address a requirement for a minimum deliberation 
period. In a plurality decision, it affirmed the convictions in Apodaca 
with Justice Powell concurring in the result yet disagreeing with the 
plurality’s rationale.84 
Justices Byron White, Warren Burger, Harry Blackmun, and 
William Rehnquist found that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a jury 
trial did not require unanimity under the Fourteenth Amendment 
because “[a] requirement of unanimity . . . does not materially 
contribute” to the purpose of trial by jury, which “is to prevent 
oppression by the Government by providing a ‘safeguard against the 
corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or 
eccentric judge.’”85 Justice White contended that the Sixth Amendment 
jury trial, which developed separately from the due process reasonable 
 
78 Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 411 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970)). 
81 Id. at 412–13. 
82 Reply Brief for Petitioners at 2, Apodaca, 406 U.S. 404 (No.69-5046). 
83 Id. at 1–2. 
84 Johnson, 406 U.S. at 366 (Powell, J., concurring). 
85 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 410 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)). 
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doubt standard constitutionally required in In re Winship, “does not 
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt at all.”86 Justice White also 
rejected the idea that being outvoted by a majority of jurors would 
silence the voice of a juror representing a minority group.87 
Justice White referenced Kalven and Zeisel’s The American Jury, 
published in 1966, to find that unanimity “would obviously produce 
hung juries in some situations where nonunanimous juries will convict 
or acquit.”88 The conclusion that nonunanimous verdicts are 
“functionally equivalent” to unanimous verdicts, however, does not 
appear to be based on any data or even reasoning. The plurality simply 
stated that “[i]n terms of this function we perceive no difference 
between juries required to act unanimously and those permitted to 
convict or acquit by votes of [ten] to two or [eleven] to one.”89 
Justice Powell (supplying the fifth vote) wrote a concurring opinion, 
finding that “unanimity is one of the indispensable features of a federal 
jury trial,” because “[a]t the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, 
unanimity had long been established as one of the attributes of a jury 
conviction at common law.”90 However, he also found that not “all of 
the elements of jury trial within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment 
are necessarily embodied in or incorporated into the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”91 Justice Powell cited Kalven 
and Zeisel’s The American Jury, published in 1971, to support the 
proposition that “the jury-trial protection is not substantially affected 
by less-than-unanimous verdict requirements.”92 
Justices William Douglas, William Brennan, and Thurgood 
Marshall dissented, and Justice Potter Stewart wrote a separate 
dissenting opinion.93 The dissenting Justices found that the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial clearly required jury unanimity, citing 
Andres v. United States and stating, “[u]nanimity in jury verdicts is 
 
86 Id. at 411 (applying In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)). 
87 Id. at 413. 
88 Id. at 411. 
89 Id. 
90 Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 369–71 (1970) (Powell, J., concurring in both 
Johnson and Apodaca) (emphasis in original). 
91 Id. at 369 (Powell, J., concurring). 
92 Id. at 374 (Powell, J., concurring in Apodaca). 
93 Id. at 380 (Douglas, J., joined by Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting in both 
Apodaca and Johnson). 
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required where the Sixth and Seventh Amendments apply.”94 Justice 
Stewart’s dissenting opinion noted that Duncan v. Louisiana “squarely 
held that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury in a federal criminal 
case is made wholly applicable to state criminal trials by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”95 Justice Douglas wrote in his joint Apodaca-Johnson 
dissenting opinion that “it is almost inconceivable that anyone would 
have questioned whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt was in fact, 
the constitutional standard. And, indeed, when such a case finally 
arose, we had little difficulty disposing of the issue.”96 The dissents 
further equated the Court’s decision to allow nonunanimous verdicts in 
criminal cases to giving the states the power to experiment with the 
civil rights of its most vulnerable citizens.97 
While Justice Powell agreed with the dissenters that the Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial required unanimity, he declined to apply 
the basic incorporation doctrine. Thus, even though five Justices agreed 
that the Sixth Amendment requires unanimity in trials, and eight 
Justices agreed that the Sixth Amendment should apply the same in 
state court as it does in federal court,98 the Court upheld the defendants’ 
nonunanimous convictions.99 Accordingly, the result of Apodaca is 
that while federal criminal jury trials require unanimity, state juries 
may deprive a criminal defendant of his liberty by returning a 
nonunanimous verdict. 
Effectively, this means that since 1972 criminal defendants in 
Oregon and Louisiana are convicted and imprisoned, even in felony 
cases that carry a potential sentence of life, by nonunanimous juries. 
These same defendants could have been acquitted100 if they were 
 
94 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 414 (Stewart, J., with whom Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., join, 
dissenting); id. at 380–83 (Douglas, J., with whom Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., concur, 
dissenting) (stating that the opinion also applies to No. 69-5046, Apodaca et al. v. Oregon, 
post, p. 404). 
95 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 414 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
96 Johnson, 406 U.S. at 381 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
97 Id. at 387 (Justice Douglas, dissenting). 
98 “These [eight] Justices were simply and properly applying Duncan and standard 
incorporation doctrine that once a clause of the Bill of Rights is deemed sufficiently 
‘fundamental’ to be incorporated against the states, it applies identically to the states with 
all its interpretative precedent.” Stephen Kanter, Sleeping Beauty Wide Awake: State 
Constitutions as Important Independent Sources of Individual Rights, 15 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 799, 814 (2011). 
99 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 414 (affirming the judgment below). 
100 These cases would be considered hung juries and the state would have the opportunity 
to retry the defendants. 
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prosecuted in a federal court or in any of the other forty-eight states in 
the United States. 
2. The Court’s Failure to Review Apodaca and Johnson Leaves 
Dangerous Precedent Alive 
Despite a flurry of petitions in the past several years, the Supreme 
Court continues to deny certiorari to cases from Louisiana and Oregon 
seeking clarity on the issue of the nonunanimous jury rule.101 In these 
cases, the State convicted defendants by nonunanimous juries of 10−2 
or 11–1.102 This represents more than a theoretical harm caused by 
legal ambiguity because, even though one or two jurors did not believe 
the State proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, defendants have 
been sentenced to decades of imprisonment, life sentences, and hard 
labor.103 
For example, a nonunanimous jury convicted Alonso Herrera in 
Oregon State Court.104 The State charged Mr. Herrera with 
unauthorized use of a vehicle and possession of a stolen vehicle after 
police arrested him for borrowing a car from a friend and failing to 
return it.105 Mr. Herrera asked for a jury instruction that the verdict be 
unanimous, but the trial court denied the request.106 Although eleven 
jurors voted to acquit Mr. Herrera of the stolen vehicle charge, ten 
 
101 See O’Dowd v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 1858 (2015) (cert. denied); Parker v. Louisiana, 
135 S. Ct. 1714 (2015) (cert. denied); Dorsey v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct.1495 (2015) (cert. 
denied); Huey v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 1507 (2015) (cert. denied); Scott v. Louisiana, 135 
S. Ct. 2812 (2015) (cert. denied); Blueford v. Louisiana (2015) (cert. denied); Webb v. 
Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 1719 (2015) (cert. denied); Mosley v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 40 (2015) 
(cert. denied); Fields v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 121 (2014) (cert. denied); Jackson v. 
Louisiana, 134 S. Ct. 1950 (2014) (cert. denied); Hankton v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 195 
(2014) (cert. denied); McElveen v. Louisiana, 133 S.Ct. 1237 (2013) (cert. denied); Herrera 
v. Oregon, 562 U.S. 1135 (2011) (cert. denied). This is not an exhaustive list. 
102 O’Dowd, 135 S. Ct. 1858; Parker, 135 S. Ct. 1714; Dorsey, 135 S. Ct. 1495; Huey, 
135 S. Ct. 1507; Scott, 135 S. Ct. 2812; Blueford, 135 S.Ct. 1900; Webb, 135 S. Ct. 1719; 
Mosley, 136 S. Ct. 40; Fields, 135 S. Ct. 121; Jackson, 134 S. Ct. 1950; Hankton, 135 S. Ct. 
195; McElveen, 133 S. Ct. 1237; Herrera, 562 U.S. 1135. 
103 See State v. Parker, No. 17543, 2014 La. App. Unpub. LEXIS 99 (1st Cir. Feb. 20, 
2014) (exemplifying a case in which the defendant was convicted of manslaughter by a 10−2 
jury and sentenced to thirty-five years of hard labor); State v. Dorsey, 137 So. 3d 651 (2014) 
(exemplifying a case in which, after a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury, defendant was tried 
again, convicted by a nonunanimous jury verdict, and sentenced to life imprisonment at hard 
labor without parole). 
104 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Herrera, 562 U.S. 1135 (No. 10-344). 
105 Brief for Respondent State of Oregon in Opposition at 1, Herrera, 562 U.S. 1135 (No. 
10-344). 
106 Id. at 1–3; Herrera, 562 U.S. 1135. 
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jurors voted to convict him of the unauthorized use charge.107 This 
resulted in a conviction for unauthorized use of a vehicle, a Class C 
felony that carries a maximum prison term of up to five years.108 
Oregon courts and the Supreme Court declined to review Mr. Herrera’s 
nonunanimous conviction.109 
Jurors also disagree in more serious cases. In Louisiana, a less-than-
unanimous jury convicted Joseph Blueford of aggravated battery and 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.110 One of the State’s 
witnesses admitted to lying to the police about seeing Mr. Blueford 
firing the gun.111 Two other witnesses had pretrial contact with an 
assistant district attorney but at trial denied discussing their testimony 
with the State or even meeting with the district attorney.112 
Furthermore, during deliberation, one of the jurors admitted she had 
not heard or understood anything said during trial.113 Both the State 
and the defense counsel agreed not to excuse the juror, and the court 
relied on the jury’s ability to return a nonunanimous verdict.114 The 
juror who had not heard any of the evidence simply voted with the 
majority.115 Even so, the jury did not return a unanimous verdict.116 
Mr. Blueford is now serving a life sentence with hard labor and a 
concurrent sixty-five-year hard labor term.117 
In forty-eight other states and in federal court, the nonunanimous 
verdicts in these cases and many others could have a different outcome. 
 
107 Brief for Respondent State of Oregon in Opposition, supra note 105, at 2. 
108 See OR. REV. STAT. § 164.135(2) (2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.605(3) (2015). 
Although this may seem to some like a suitably minor punishment for a minor crime, there 
are collateral consequences for even “minor” felony convictions. Someone convicted of a 
felony in Oregon loses the right to vote while incarcerated and is unable to receive public 
benefits once he or she is released. Anyone convicted of a felony is ineligible to possess a 
firearm. Additionally, obtaining a job with a felony conviction will likely prove to be a 
difficult or impossible task. See OR. REV. STAT. § 166.270 (2015); COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, http://www.aba 
collateralconsequences.org/search/?jurisdiction=40 (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
109 Brief for Respondent State of Oregon in Opposition, supra note 105, at 2. 
110 State v. Blueford, 137 So. 3d 54, 55, 66 (2d Cir. 2014). 
111 Id. at 56. 
112 Id. at 57. 
113 Id. at 66. 
114 Id. at 66–67 (instructing the jurors, after discovering that one juror had not heard the 
evidence at trial, that “the provisions or charge still say that at least ten of you must agree 
on the same verdict on each count. It requires ten of the twelve agreeing on each count. So 
that is my response to you”). 
115 Id. at 67. 
116 Id. at 65–66. 
117 Id. at 55. 
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Research indicates that nonunanimous verdicts are rendered in over 
forty percent of all felony jury verdicts in Oregon.118 These cases, 
evidencing a surprisingly high rate of nonunanimous verdicts, may 
have otherwise resulted in unanimous verdicts after further 
deliberation. Without being required to fully deliberate, however, 
jurors may grasp at the opportunity to quickly return to their everyday 
lives. 
Unlike felony cases, someone accused of a misdemeanor in Oregon 
is entitled to a unanimous vote of six.119 This means that an Oregon 
defendant facing a potential sentence of a year or less will be accorded 
a unanimous verdict, while the State need only convince a majority of 
the jury when an Oregon defendant faces a life sentence. This 
incongruity could be multiplied across the nation while the failure to 
revisit and clarify Apodaca leaves the door open for other states to 
adopt nonunanimous jury verdicts in criminal cases. In the wake of 
Apodaca, several states tried to amend their constitutions to allow 
nonunanimous jury verdicts. 
In the 1980s the California Senate rejected a bill, sponsored by a 
former district attorney, proposing nonunanimous verdicts in criminal 
trials.120 In 1995, two bills proposing a constitutional amendment 
allowing 10–2 and 11–1 jury votes were presented to the California 
legislature.121 Similarly, the Washington State Legislature received a 
proposed amendment to the constitution along with a proposed act 
allowing 10–2 verdicts in criminal trials in 1997.122 In 2001, HB 1397 
proposed to allow 10–2 criminal jury verdicts in Mississippi.123 In 
2003, a New York resolution proposed a state constitutional 
amendment requiring only three-fourths of the jurors to agree on a 
 
118 OFFICE OF PUB. DEFENSE SERVS., ON THE FREQUENCY OF NON-UNANIMOUS 
FELONY VERDICTS IN OREGON 4–5 (May 21, 2009). 
119 Adam Liptak, Guilty by a 10-2 Vote: Efficient or Unconstitutional?, N.Y. TIMES (July 
6, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/07/us/07bar.html; OR. REV. STAT. § 136.210(2) 
(2015). 
120 Jeremy Osher, Jury Unanimity in California: Should it Stay or Should it Go, 29 LOY. 
LA. L. REV. 1319, 1337–38 (1996). 
121 Id. at 1323. 
122 H.J.R. 4205, H. Comm. Law & Justice, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1997); H.B. 1295, 
55th Legis., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1997). 
123 H.B. No. 1397, Miss. Leg., 2001 Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2001) (introduced by Andrew 
Ketchings, the bill died in committee). Ketchings introduced the bill again in the 2002 
Regular Session, H.B. 611, which also died in committee. See H.B. No. 611, Miss. Leg., 
2002 Reg. Sess. (Miss 2002), http://billstatus.ls.state.ms.us/2002/pdf/history/HB/HB0611 
.htm. 
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verdict in felony cases, although a five-sixths verdict was required in 
civil or misdemeanor cases.124 The purpose of the New York 
amendment was to “produce more convictions and put more criminals 
behind bars.”125 
Despite the Constitutional requirement of unanimous verdicts in 
federal court, even Congress has not been immune to proposals for 
nonunanimous jury verdicts in criminal cases. In 1995, Senator Strom 
Thurman introduced a bill to amend the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure to allow a verdict agreed upon by five-sixths of the jury.126 
While all of these proposed amendments ultimately failed, they 
demonstrate how regularly the unanimous verdict requirement comes 
under attack in light of the confusing precedent of Apodaca. While the 
proposed amendments generally allowed for 10–2 verdicts, states could 
arguably propose and adopt a constitutional amendment allowing nine 
out of twelve jurors to reach a verdict.127 While only two states allow 
nonunanimous verdicts in criminal trials currently, state constitutions 
appear to be most vulnerable to changes in the unanimous verdict 
requirement following a highly publicized criminal trial.128 Whether or 
not the public outcry that results from the extensive media coverage of 
a criminal trial is justified, it is not a sound basis for altering the 
protections accorded to every criminal defendant charged with any 
crime. 
II 
CURRENT SUPREME COURT LAW DIRECTLY CONTRADICTS THE 
APPROACH USED BY JUSTICE POWELL IN APODACA V. OREGON 
Ironically, despite the agreement of eight Justices that unanimity 
rules should apply equally to juries in state and federal trials, Justice 
Powell’s opinion in Apodaca concluding that the Fourteenth 
 
124 Matthew Tulchin, An Analysis of the Development of the Jury’s Role in a New York 
Criminal Trial, 13 J.L. & POL’Y, 425, 425 n.1 (2005). 
125 Id. at 425–26 (2005) (quoting NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF LEGISLATION, Assemb. 4469, 226th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003)). 
126 S. 1426, 104th Cong. (1995). Senator Thurman is well known for his twenty-four hour 
and eighteen minute filibuster in 1957 in opposition to desegregation. See Kevin R. Johnson, 
Book Review Essay, The Legacy of Jim Crow: The Enduring Taboo of Black-White 
Romance, 84 TEX L. REV. 739, 744 (2006). 
127 In Johnson v. Louisiana, the defendant was convicted by a 9–3 verdict, which was 
upheld by the Supreme Court. 
128 Osher, supra note 120, at 1321–22 (noting the highly publicized trial of O.J. 
Simpson). As stated above, the 1934 trial of Jacob Silverman led to the constitutional 
amendment in Oregon allowing nonunanimous criminal verdicts. 
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Amendment does not incorporate the Sixth Amendment unanimous 
jury requirement became the law. Indeed, recent Supreme Court 
decisions involving incorporation have completely undermined 
Powell’s two-track approach to unanimity in criminal trials. The 
Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in McDonald v. City of Chicago 
unambiguously rejected the concept of a “watered-down, subjective 
version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights,” that would 
allow different standards between the states and the federal government 
for the protection of fundamental rights.129 As Professor Eugene 
Volokh has correctly argued, “Apodaca’s ‘watered-down’ 
incorporation of the Jury Trial Clause is thus a constitutional anomaly, 
based on logic that this Court has repudiated in McDonald, and that 
was inconsistent with prior precedent even at the time of Apodaca 
itself.”130 
The incorporation doctrine is the process by which American courts 
have applied portions of the Bill of Rights to the states through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.131 Prior to 1925, the Bill 
of Rights was held to apply only to the federal government. Today, 
most of the Bill of Rights have been incorporated. Only the Fifth 
Amendment right to an indictment by a grand jury,132 the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial in civil lawsuits,133 the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of excessive fines,134 the Third 
Amendment’s protection against quartering soldiers,135 and, the 
subject of this Article, the Sixth Amendment’s right to a unanimous 
jury verdict, remain unincorporated.136 
Prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
development of the incorporation doctrine, the Supreme Court held in 
Barron v. Baltimore137 that the Bill of Rights applied only to the federal 
 
129 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 (2010) (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 
378 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1964)). 
130 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 104, at 11. 
131 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 759–61. 
132 Id. at 765 n.13. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 See Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d. 957, 961 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding the Third 
Amendment incorporated against the states and noting its rare use as the reason for there 
being no precedent incorporating it). 
136 See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). 
137 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
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government but not any state governments.138 Even years after the 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1876, the Supreme Court 
in United States v. Crukshank still held that the First and Second 
Amendments did not apply to state governments.139 However, 
beginning with the Slaughter House Cases in 1873140 and then in the 
through a series of opinions in the 1920s, the Supreme Court has 
gradually interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate most 
of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, making them enforceable against 
state governments.141 The Court explicitly began142 recognizing 
incorporation of various provisions of the Bill of Rights in 1925 in 
Gitlow v. New York, which incorporated the First Amendment’s 
freedom of speech clause.143 In 1947, in Adamson v. California,144 
Justice Hugo Black argued in his dissent that the Court should pursue 
total incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Yet instead, over the following 
twenty-five years, the Supreme Court has employed a doctrine of 
selective incorporation.145 By the second half of the twentieth century, 
nearly all of the rights in the Bill of Rights had been applied to the 
states. The ad hoc process of incorporation continues to this day. Most 
recently, in 2010, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to incorporation 
in McDonald v. City of Chicago.146 
In McDonald v. Chicago, the Supreme Court considered whether the 
Second Amendment right to carry firearms applies to state and local 
governments.147 In a 5–4 decision, the Court ruled that the right of an 
individual to “keep and bear arms” protected by the Second 
 
138 Id. at 247. 
139 92 U.S. 542, 552–53 (1875). 
140 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
141 The Supreme Court began a process called “selective incorporation“ by gradually 
applying selected provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause. 
142 The first case of incorporation was in Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad Co. 
v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), in which the Supreme Court required just compensation 
for property appropriated by state or local authorities (applying the Fifth Amendment in the 
Bill of Rights). 
143 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
144 332 U.S. 46, 74–75 (Balck, J., dissenting) (1947). 
145 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 758–59. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. In 2008, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the Supreme Court 
struck down similar District of Columbia legislation on the grounds that it violated an 
individual’s Second Amendment right to keep and bear firearms for lawful uses such as self-
defense in one’s home. But the Court declined to say whether this Second Amendment right 
applies to the states and local governments and not just the District of Columbia, which is 
under federal jurisdiction. The Court answered this question in McDonald v. Chicago. 
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Amendment is incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and thus applies to states in addition to the 
federal government.148 Writing for the majority, Justice Samuel Alito 
observed: “[I]t is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those 
fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.”149 In 
reaching its decision, the Court held that “[t]he relationship between 
the Bill of Rights’ guarantees and the States must be governed by a 
single, neutral principle” and “incorporated Bill of Rights protections 
‘are all to be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth 
Amendment according to the same standards that protect those personal 
rights against federal encroachment.’”150 The Court explained what it 
meant for a right to be “of such a nature” as to be “included in the 
conception of due process of law.”151 Such rights, the Court explained 
include “immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea 
of free government . . . ,”152 principles “so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,”153 and 
values “essential to a fair and enlightened system of justice.”154 
Essentially, the McDonald Court applied the Duncan v. Louisiana 
incorporation standard it used in the 1960s to incorporate the right to 
jury trial under the Sixth Amendment.155 The Court explained that the 
Duncan standard constituted a departure from the less-encompassing 
test that had been used in incorporation cases since the late nineteenth 
century—namely, whether the right is of “the very essence of a scheme 
of ordered liberty”156 or a “principle of natural equity, recognized by 
all temperate and civilized governments.”157 
 
148 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791. 
149 Id. at 778. 
150 Id. at 788, 765 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
151 Id. at 759 (quoting Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908)). 
152 Id. at 760 (quoting Twining, 211 U.S. at 102). 
153 Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). 
154 Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
155 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968) (holding that incorporation of a 
right is based on whether it is “among those fundamental principles of liberty and justice 
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions, whether it is ‘basic in our 
system of jurisprudence,’ and whether it is a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial”) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
156 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
157 Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago,166 U.S. 226, 238 (1897). 
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In McDonald, the Court acknowledged the anomaly of Apodaca as 
“one exception to this general rule.”158 The McDonald Court made 
clear that Apodaca “was the result of an unusual division among the 
Justices, not an endorsement of the two-track approach to 
incorporation.”159 It further explained that Apodaca does not 
“undermine the well-established rule that incorporated Bill of Rights 
protections apply identically to the States and the Federal 
Government.”160 Some courts view this as an affirmation of 
Apodaca.161 But even when Apodaca was decided, Justice Powell 
himself acknowledged that his opinion of incorporation conflicted with 
Duncan v. Louisiana.162 Indeed, most of the Sixth Amendment’s 
provisions were incorporated to the states prior to Apodaca,163 and in 
the intervening years between Apodaca and McDonald, Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence has continuously applied an approach to 
incorporation similar to the one used in McDonald.164 As McDonald 
expressly acknowledged, in effect, Apodaca is a jurisprudential orphan, 
 
158 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 766 n.14. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. The McDonald Court’s footnote even quotes a portion of Justice Brennan’s dissent 
that eight of the nine Justices agreed with, which argued that the Sixth Amendment’s 
guarantees provide an “identical application against both State and Federal Governments.” 
Id. 
161 See State v. Webb, 133 So. 3d 258, 285 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The Court in [McDonald] 
recently affirmed the continuing viability of its holding in Apodaca that the use of 
nonunanimous juries in state criminal trials is not prohibited by the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”). 
162 Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 375 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); see Duncan 
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury 
trial in all criminal cases which—were they to be tried in a federal court—would come 
within the Sixth Amendment guarantee.”). 
163 See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (incorporating right to speedy 
trial); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) (incorporating right to trial by impartial jury); 
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (right to public trial); see also Rabe v. Washington, 405 
U.S. 313 (1972) (right to notice of accusations); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right 
to confront adverse witnesses). The Supreme Court applied the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel to capital cases in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); to felony cases in Gideon 
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); and to imprisonable misdemeanors in Argersinger v. 
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
164 See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (ruling that the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial, incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, prohibited judges from enhancing criminal sentences beyond statutory 
maximums based on facts other than those decided by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt); 
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (applying Apprendi and holding the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial prohibited judges from enhancing criminal sentences based 
on facts other than those decided by the jury or admitted by the defendant); Cunningham v. 
California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007) (applying Apprendi and Blakely to California’s Determinate 
Sentencing Rule). 
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stranded from the rationales employed by the Court in all other 
incorporation cases.165 The implication of McDonald is that 
overturning Apodaca should be easy and, in fact, suggests that the 
Court should incorporate the few unincorporated fundamental 
provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
Jury unanimity meets the McDonald incorporation standard as it is 
rooted in common law and history signifying that the Founders 
considered jury unanimity a fundamental right.166 The earliest 
documentation of a unanimous jury verdict dates back to 1367;167 by 
the late fourteenth century, there was a widespread preference for 
unanimous verdicts,168 and it was “an accepted feature of the common-
law jury by the 18th century.”169 While its origins have never been 
clear,170 prior to the ratification of the Constitution in 1786, John 
Adams indicated “it is the unanimity of the jury that preserves the rights 
of mankind.”171 Moreover, James Madison included “the requisite of 
unanimity for conviction” in the draft of the Sixth Amendment that he 
proposed.172 Although the Constitution does not refer to unanimous 
juries,173 as the plurality in Apodaca noted, unanimity quickly obtained 
 
165 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 765 n.14. 
166 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 104, at 12–17. (“The unanimity 
requirement was indeed not just an ‘accidental,’ ‘superfluous’ detail, but an ‘essential 
element[]’ of the jury trial. It was a part of ‘our [English] constitution’ that protected ‘the 
liberties of England’ (Blackstone), and that was then accepted in America (as Story 
stressed). It ‘preserve[d] the rights of mankind’ (Adams). It was ‘of indispensable necessity’ 
(Wilson), ‘indispensable’ to a criminal jury verdict (Story), part of the American design of 
‘the several powers of government’ (Tucker), and part of the trial by jury secured by ‘all our 
constitutions’ (Dane).”). Id. at 17. 
167 Osher, supra note 120, at 1326; see also Riordan, supra note 66, at 1419; Comment, 
A Constitutional Renvoi: Unanimous Verdicts in State Criminal Trials, 41 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 115 (1972). 
168 Osher, supra note 120, at 1326–27; see also Riordan, supra note 66, at 1419 (“Even 
in fourteenth century Parliaments (where the numbers were such that a unanimity 
requirement was vastly more impractical than for a jury), there is evidence that a majority 
vote was deemed insufficient to bind the community or its individual members to a legal 
decision.”); A Constitutional Renvoi: Unanimous Verdicts in State Criminal Trials, supra 
note 167. 
169 Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 407(1972) (White, J., plurality opinion). 
170 A Constitutional Renvoi: Unanimous Verdicts in State Criminal Trials, supra note 
167, at 115. 
171 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 376 (3d ed. 1797). 
172 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 408 (White, J., plurality opinion) (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 
435 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)). 
173 Some say it was purposefully left out because it was “implicit in the very concept of 
the jury,” Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 409–10, while others argue that the Framers knew what they 
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general acceptance “as Americans became more familiar with the 
details of English common law and adopted those details in their own 
colonial legal systems.”174 In the nineteenth century, Justice Joseph 
Story explained that “[a] trial by jury is generally understood to mean  
. . . , a trial by a jury of twelve men, impartially selected, who must 
unanimously concur in the guilt of the accused before a legal conviction 
can be had.”175 And throughout the years, the Supreme Court has 
continuously reaffirmed that unanimity in federal jury verdicts is 
required under the Sixth Amendment.176 
The Court’s McDonald approach to incorporation directs 
incorporation of jury unanimity by relying on its roots in common-law 
and history. Furthermore, it is important to point out that the Apodaca 
plurality incorrectly analyzed the issue under the Sixth Amendment by 
considering the “function served by the jury in contemporary society” 
rather than its historical foundation.177 In fact, in its more recent 
opinions, the Court has recognized the necessity of examining the 
“Framers’ paradigm for criminal justice,” and not “whether or to what 
degree trial by jury impairs the efficiency or fairness of criminal 
justice.”178 For example, in Apprendi v. New Jersey,179 the Court found 
that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial incorporated against the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibited judges from 
increasing criminal sentences beyond statutory maximum based on 
facts other than those decided by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.180 
The Court there recognized that “historical foundation for our 
 
wanted to include, and the exclusion as purposeful, perhaps to avoid “forc[ing] another 
affirmative duty upon those states.” Osher, supra note 120, at 1327–28; see also Apodaca, 
406 U.S. at 410. (White, J., plurality opinion). Others contend that there was disagreement 
to the vicinage requirement of his language, that the Sixth Amendment right to trial, “by an 
impartial jury of freeholders of the vicinage, with the requisite of unanimity for conviction 
. . . .” Riordan, supra note 66, at 1419 (citing James Madison, 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 
(1789)). 
174 Apocada, 406 U.S. at 408 n.3 (White, J., plurality opinion). 
175 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 559 
n.2 (5th ed., 1891). 
176 See, e.g., Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740 (1948); Patton v. United States, 281 
U.S. 276, 288 (1930); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900). 
177 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 406–10 (White, J., plurality opinion); see Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 9–19, Miller v. Louisiana, 133 S. Ct. 1238 (2013) (No. 12-162); Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari at 11, Lee v. Louisiana, 555 U.S. 823 (2008) (No. 07-1523). This 
functional analysis first applied in Williams has not only been discredited but was abandoned 
. . . see above discussion on Williams by Smith & Saks, supra note 57. 
178 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004). 
179 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
180 Id. at 490. 
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recognition [of rights in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments] 
extends down centuries into the common law”181 and that history 
indicates that “trial by jury has been understood to require that ‘the 
truth of every accusation . . . should afterwards be confirmed by the 
unanimous suffrage of twelve of [the defendant’s] equals and 
neighbours.”182 In fact, the Court has emphasized that the Framers 
purposely did not leave the role of the jury to the government but rather 
included the “jury-trial guarantee in the Constitution . . . [because] they 
were unwilling to trust government to mark out the role of the jury.”183 
Proponents of nonunanimous verdicts counter that sentencing cases 
hold no weight when assessing the constitutionality of the 
nonunanimous jury rule.184 However, in the years since deciding 
Apprendi, the Court has applied its holding, regarding sentencing, to 
“instances involving plea bargains, sentencing guidelines, criminal 
fines, mandatory minimums, and capital punishment,”185 thus, 
conclusively demonstrating that the logic of Apprendi applies beyond 
the narrow issue that it decided. Further, the Court has been clear that 
“stare decisis does not compel adherence to a decision whose 
‘underpinnings’ have been ‘eroded’ by subsequent developments of 
constitutional law.”186 Indeed, the Court’s most recent jurisprudence 
indicates that Apodaca not only got it wrong, but also that jury 
unanimity is the only way to satisfy McDonald’s incorporation 
approach; it is rooted in common law, and history reveals that the 
Founders considered jury unanimity a fundamental right. 
 
181 Id. at 477–83 (reviewing the common law at the time of the framing to determine how 
sentencing should apply under the Sixth Amendment); see also Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305 
(ruling that sentencing factors that increase defendant’s sentence must be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (reformulating the standard 
for determining when the admission of hearsay statements in criminal cases is permitted 
under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment by looking to history of the clause). 
182 Apprendi, 406 U.S. at 477 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND 343 (1769)); see also id. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that 
charges must be determined “beyond a reasonable doubt by the unanimous vote of 12 of his 
fellow citizens”); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 238–39 (same). 
183 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 308. 
184 Brief in Opposition to the Petition for Certiorari, supra note 177, at 10 (stating 
“Apprendi did not address the issue of unanimous verdicts”). 
185 Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 621 (2016) (stating that decisions must “survive the 
reasoning of Apprendi”) (internal citations omitted) (citing Blakely, 542 U.S. 296); Alleyne 
v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013); S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 
(2012); Booker, 543 U.S. 220; Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
186 Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 623. 
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III 
MAJORITY VERDICTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS UNDERMINE THE 
REQUIREMENT THAT GUILT BE PROVEN BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT 
A true examination of the functional approach that the Apodaca 
plurality claimed to embrace also calls for a unanimous jury 
requirement. The importance of requiring a defendant to be proven 
guilty of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt187 cannot be overstated—
it “is the highest level of certainty an individual can have in the absence 
of absolute certainty.”188 In practice, the entire purpose of using the 
standard (along with the presumption of innocence), is “to test the 
prosecution’s claim of guilt” and it ostensibly works to ensure “that 
only guilty defendants are convicted” and to acquit whenever “the 
possibility of [] innocence remains after trial.”189 Because reasonable 
doubt is meant to safeguard innocent defendants from conviction, 
weakening that standard in any form not only increases the chance that 
innocent defendants will be convicted, but is contradictory to both our 
historical and practical norms.190 
 
187 Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the legal standard by which someone may be 
convicted of a crime at trial. OR. REV. STAT. § 10.095 (2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 136.415 
(2015). The burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt lies with the prosecution and 
thus every defendant is presumed innocent unless a judge or jury believes they are guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. While not defined by statute or caselaw, Oregon’s 
uniform jury instructions say this about reasonable doubt: 
Reasonable doubt is doubt based on common sense and reason. Reasonable doubt 
is not an imaginary doubt. Reasonable doubt means an honest uncertainty as to the 
guilt of the defendant. You must return a verdict of not guilty if, after careful and 
impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case, you are not convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. 
OR. UNIF. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 1009 (2012). 
188 Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Reasonable Certainty and Reasonable Doubt, 81 MARQ. L. 
REV. 655, 662–63 (1998). 
189 Id. at 659. But see JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF “REASONABLE DOUBT” 4 
(2005); James Q. Whitman, The Origins of “Reasonable Doubt”, Faculty Scholarship 
Series, Paper 1 (2005), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1/ (last visited Feb. 
5, 2017) (“The purpose of the ‘reasonable doubt’ instruction was to address this frightening 
possibility, reassuring jurors that they could convict the defendant without risking their own 
salvation, as long as their doubts about guilt were not ‘reasonable.’”). 
190 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970) (“It is critical that the moral force of 
the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether 
innocent men are being condemned.”); Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and 
the Meaning of Innocence, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 458 (1989) (“This deliberate imbalance 
[that the reasonable doubt standard creates] in favor of the defendant is a societal judgment 
that an individual’s liberty interest transcends the state’s interest in obtaining a criminal 
conviction . . . .”). 
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While the Court in Apodaca and Johnson indicated that unanimity 
and reasonable doubt are not the same, over time and with usage, the 
unanimous jury has become the manifestation of the reasonable doubt 
standard. It is so deeply established in our criminal jury trial191 that it 
is understood that, to overcome reasonable doubt, all of the jurors must 
be convinced of a defendant’s guilt. When more than one conclusion 
can be drawn from the same evidence, jurors may have opposing 
opinions about the guilt of a defendant. Jurors, who could have been 
excused in voir dire for any inability to rationally decide the case, are 
then responsible for reconciling inapposite conclusions. A 
nonunanimous verdict demonstrates the existence of reasonable doubt 
that could not be explained during the deliberation of twelve vetted 
jurors and shows that the government has failed to meet its burden of 
proof. Yet, in Apodaca, Justice White said: “That rational men disagree 
is not itself equivalent to a failure of proof by the State, nor does it 
indicate infidelity to the reasonable-doubt standard.”192 The Court’s 
analyses in Apodaca and Johnson finding “no difference between juries 
required to act unanimously and those permitted to acquit or convict by 
votes of ten to two or eleven to one,”193 significantly weakens the 
reasonable doubt standard and diminishes its purpose altogether.194 As 
Justice Marshall explained, “it cuts the heart out of two of the most 
important and inseparable safeguards the Bill of Rights offers a 
criminal defendant . . . . After today, the skeleton of these safeguards 
remains, but the Court strips them of life and of meaning.”195 
Moreover, the Court’s own case law prior to Apodaca and Johnson 
and since then, confirms this right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
through jury unanimity as a component of the jury trial guarantee. Like 
most of the jury trial guarantees provided by the Sixth Amendment, the 
phrase “reasonable doubt” does not actually appear anywhere in the 
Constitution, and the Court has expressed that while the rule did not 
 
191 Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 399, 399 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing “the 
nature of the ‘jury’ that is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment”). 
192 Id. at 362. 
193 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 411; see also id. at 412 (“We are quite sure, however, that the 
Sixth Amendment itself has never been held to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt in 
criminal cases.”); Johnson, 406 U.S. at 361 (finding that three hold out jurors “does not in 
itself demonstrate that, had the nine jurors of the majority attended further to reason and the 
evidence, all or one of them would have developed reasonable doubt”). 
194 In fact, Justice White conceded that “the State’s proof could perhaps be regarded as 
more certain if it had convinced all 12 jurors instead of only nine.” Johnson, 406 U.S. at 
362. 
195 Id. at 399 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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actually “crystalliz[e] . . . until as late as 1789,” it did “read the familiar 
standard of proof into our Constitution” in 1970.196 And “[s]ince then, 
the Court has insisted unwaveringly on the fundamental importance of 
the requirement of ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’ even at the cost 
of throwing American sentencing law into ‘far reaching . . . and 
disturbing’ confusion.”197 In In re Winship,198 the Supreme Court 
confirmed the reasonable doubt standard was constitutionally required. 
There, the Court explained that “[e]xpressions in many opinions of this 
Court indicate that it has long been assumed that proof of a criminal 
charge beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required.”199 
Moreover, the Court explained that the reasonable doubt standard 
“provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence—that 
bedrock axiomatic and elementary principle whose enforcement lies at 
the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”200 In other 
words, the presumption of innocence only has value if the State can 
overcome it by meeting the most demanding standard possible. 
More recently, the Court has explained the importance of the 
reasonable doubt standard. In Jones v. United States201 in 1999, the 
Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial guarantees the 
right to have any fact that is an element of an offense “be charged in 
the indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven by the Government 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”202 And in Apprendi, the Court found that 
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial requires all elements of the 
crime to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in state criminal trials.203 
Reaffirming this two years later in Ring v. Arizona,204 the Court stated: 
“If a State makes an increase in a defendant’s authorized punishment 
on the contingent of a finding of fact, that fact—no matter how the State 
labels it—must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”205 The 
Court has continuously confirmed that proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
is a requirement in all criminal jury trials.206 
 
196 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 374 (1970); Whitman, supra note 189, at 2. 
197 Whitman, supra note 189, at 2 (stating that “it is inconceivable that we could abandon 
our American commitment to the ‘reasonable doubt’ standard of proof”). 
198 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
199 Id. at 362. 
200 Id. at 363. 
201 526 U.S. 227 (1999). 
202 Id. at 252. 
203 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000). 
204 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
205 Id. at 602. 
206 Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 281 (2007); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313–14. 
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Moreover, weakening the right to a Sixth Amendment jury trial by 
canceling out jurors with minority opinions, those “unreasonable 
juror[s],”207 “does not turn on the relative rationality, fairness, or 
efficiency of potential factfinders,”208 it merely relies on weakening the 
reasonable doubt standard. The very fact that Oregon and Louisiana 
require unanimous juries in first-degree murder/capital cases shows 
that both states chose greater certainty by not weakening the reasonable 
doubt standard in their most serious cases.209 The Oregon Supreme 
Court has said so much by declaring that the state’s nonunanimous jury 
law is “to make it easier to obtain convictions.”210 The right to jury trial 
demands that we do not make it easier to convict; “the prosecutor in a 
criminal case must actually overcome the presumption of innocence, 
all reasonable doubts to guilt, and the unanimous verdict 
requirement.”211 As the late Justice Antonin Scalia wrote of the jury 
trial, “it has never been efficient; but it has always been free.”212 
The Apodaca and Johnson rulings that left nonunanimous jury rules 
standing in Oregon and Louisiana deprive criminal defendants of the 
right to have dissenting jurors’ views count against unreliable evidence, 
proof of innocence, or anything else that creates reasonable doubt,213 
and the analyses from those cases have been repeatedly rejected by the 
Court’s own jurisprudence. The reasonable doubt requirement is not 
only “self-evident,”214 but it applies equally in state proceedings.215 
 
207 Brief of Amicus Curiae the Federal Public Defender for the District of Oregon in 
Support of Petitioner at 20–22, Herrera v. Oregon, 562 U.S. 1135 (2011) (No. 10-344). 
208 Ring, 536 U.S. at 607 (2002). 
209 Riordan, supra note 66, at 1426 (citing Reply Brief for Petitioner on Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari at 7–8, Bowen v. Oregon, 558 U.S. 815 (2009) (No. 08-1117)); see also In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (“[E]very individual going about his ordinary affairs [must] 
have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense 
without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with the utmost certainty.”). 
210 Riordan, supra note 66, at 1427; State ex rel. Smith v. Sawyer, 263 Or. 136, 138 
(1972) (en banc) (stating “[i]t clearly appears from the argument in the Voters’ Pamphlet 
that the amendment was intended to make it easier to obtain convictions”). 
211 Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1950). 
212 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000). 
213 Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 380, 381 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (referring to 
Winship, “it is almost inconceivable that anyone would have questioned whether proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt was in fact the constitutional standard. And, indeed, when such 
a case finally arose we had little difficulty disposing of it”). 
214 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277–78 (1993). 
215 “[A]s the great bulwark of [our] civil and political liberties, trial by jury has been 
understood to require by the truth of every accusation . . . should afterwards be confirmed 
by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of [the defendant’s] equals and neighbors.” United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 239 (2005) (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477). 
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IV 
CURRENT RESEARCH INDICATES THAT UNANIMITY IS ESSENTIAL TO 
THE PURPOSES OF THE FAIR CROSS SECTION REQUIREMENT AND 
COMPLETE DELIBERATION REQUIRED BY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
The Court in Taylor v. Louisiana confirmed that the fair cross 
section requirement is fundamental to a criminal defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury because it “guard[s] against the exercise of 
arbitrary power.”216 In Apodaca, however, Justice White and Justice 
Powell believed that unanimity did not affect the jury’s ability to 
perform its “safeguarding function,” as long as the jury was still 
composed of a cross section of the community and given a full 
opportunity to deliberate.217 When Apodaca and Johnson were decided 
in the 1970s, little research was available on juror diversity and 
interaction.218 The Court based its opinion concerning the fair cross 
section requirement on the most current available research in 1972, 
which had been conducted a decade earlier.219 
The Justices relied in part on The American Jury, a study of jury 
verdicts in 3500 civil and criminal trials, to reach their decision in 
Apodaca.220 Presumably, the Court experienced difficulty gauging 
whether minority viewpoints would be discarded under a 
nonunanimous verdict rule when the only available studies on jurors 
had been conducted in the late 1950s, at a time when most jurors were 
likely to be white males.221 After the controversial decisions in 
Apodaca and Johnson, increased interest in juries lead to new research 
about jury deliberation, decision-making, and juror bias.222 This 
 
216 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). 
217 Id. 
218 See Dennis J. Devine et. al., 7 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 622, 623 (2001) (noting that 
only isolated studies were conducted before World War II and the first systematic research 
study did not being until 1953). 
219 Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 401 n.5; Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 373–
74 (1972) (citing H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (Phoenix ed. 1971), and 
noting that “Oregon’s practice may result in verdicts in some 2.5% more of the cases”). 
Justice Powell reasoned that “given the large number of causes to which this disparity might 
be attributed . . . it is impossible to conclude that this percentage represents convictions 
obtained under standards offensive to due process.” Johnson, 406 U.S. at 374–75 n.12; see 
Devine et. al., supra note 218, at 622–23 (stating that the Chicago Jury Project began in 
1953 and that Kalven and Ziesel’s book The American Jury stemmed from that project). 
220 Id.; see also Devine et. al., supra note 218, at 623. 
221 See Erin York Cornwell & Valerie P. Hans, Representation Through Participation: 
A Multilevel Analysis of Jury Deliberations, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 667, 670 (2011) (stating 
that “[t]he earliest studies lacked racial variation in jury composition”). 
222 See Devine et. al., supra note 218. 
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research demonstrates how the nonunanimous verdict rule may deprive 
a criminal defendant of the right to a jury that both represents the 
community and is given the opportunity to fully deliberate.223 
For example, the Court could not have weighed the then unknown 
effects of implicit bias on the jury in arriving at its decision to allow 
nonunanimous verdicts. Implicit bias is when “people possess attitudes 
over which they have little or no conscious, intentional control.”224 
These implicit biases, racial or otherwise, unconsciously affect how 
jurors view the defendant and the facts. To be clear, having an implicit 
racial bias does not mean someone is racially prejudiced; people who 
have an implicit racial bias may, in fact, renounce prejudice.225 It is, 
instead, an unconscious reflection of societal stereotypes.226 
Current research on jurors consistently shows that jurors who are 
similar to the defendant in “some salient respect” are biased in favor of 
the defendant.227 A result of “jury-defendant similarity bias” is that 
white-majority juries are more likely to convict minority defendants 
than white defendants, simply because they are unlike the 
defendants.228 Additionally, jurors may unknowingly engage in 
“implicit memory bias,” affecting how they remember important facts 
from the trial.229 In one study, participants “had an easier time 
successfully recalling aggressive facts when the actor was African 
American compared to when the actor was Caucasian.”230 In sum, 
recent research indicates that jurors sympathize with “similar” 
defendants while unconsciously reinforcing social stereotypes against 
“different” defendants. 
Of course, the purpose of gathering twelve of the defendant’s peers 
together is to allow them to discuss and compare alternate views of the 
evidence presented at trial. When two of those voices may be ignored, 
however, there is no guarantee of a full and fair deliberation. This is 
partly because nonunanimous juries are more likely “to adopt a verdict-
 
223 Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1261, 
1272–74 (2000). 
224 Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and 
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 354 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). 
225 Id. at 360. 
226 See id. at 363. 
227 Devine et al., supra note 218, at 673–74. 
228 Id. 
229 Levinson, supra note 224, at 345–46. 
230 Id. at 398–99. 
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driven deliberation style” instead of an evidence-driven style.231 A 
verdict-driven jury will stop deliberating when a consensus is reached. 
Thus, if ten members on an Oregon state jury agree at the outset, no 
deliberation concerning the facts need take place. An evidence-driven 
jury will start by discussing and comparing views on the evidence. 
Accordingly, a verdict driven jury is unlikely to correct faulty memory 
due to implicit bias because the jury is likely to “skip the early story 
stages,” and focus on getting a verdict.232 A unanimous verdict 
requirement, which provides no incentive for early polling that may 
lead to a verdict-driven deliberation style, is necessary to promote an 
evidence-driven deliberation style that will result in more thorough and 
inclusive deliberations.233 Additionally, deliberating through 
disagreements instead of ceasing deliberation when consensus is 
reached promotes accuracy of the verdict reached by the jury. 
Furthermore, the nonunanimous rule may play a greater role when 
the strength of the State’s evidence is “not particularly weak or 
strong.”234 As Professor Michael Saks has explained, “[j]uries rarely 
hang unless a wide division of opinion existed at the outset. And 
nothing leads to differences of opinion among jurors better than 
ambiguity in the evidence, or plausible alternative interpretations of the 
evidence.”235 This directly contradicts the theory that “unreasonable” 
jurors are the cause of hung juries; instead, an insufficiency of evidence 
presented by the State may be the cause of dissenting jurors. If 
unreasonable jurors are not the leading cause of hung juries, the 
nonunanimous verdict rule only exists to convict defendants without 
the requisite proof. 
The Court assumed in Apodaca that the nonunanimous verdict rule 
would not affect jury deliberation, but it is now clear that “verdict-
driven” juries engage in less deliberation, and that juries are more likely 
to reach an accurate decision the longer they deliberate.236 This 
research, unavailable to the Court in 1972, highlights the importance of 
 
231 Angela A. Allen-Bell, How The Narrative About Louisiana’s Nonunanimous 
Criminal Jury System Became a Person of Interest in the Case Against Justice in the Deep 
South, 67 MERCER L. REV. 585, 607 (2016). 
232 Levinson, supra note 224, at 388. 
233 See Nancy S. Marder, Gender Dynamics and Jury Deliberations, 96 YALE L.J. 593, 
602 (1987). 
234 See Devine et. al., supra note 218, at 669. 
235 Michael J. Saks, What do Jury Experiments Tell us About How Juries (Should) Make 
Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 41 (1997). 
236 Thomas L. Brunell et. al., Factors Affecting the Length of Time a Jury Deliberates: 
Case Characteristics and Jury Composition, 5 REV. L. & ECON., 555, 576 (2009). 
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unanimous verdicts, giving weight to the viewpoint of minority 
members to combat implicit biases in the criminal justice system. 
Nonunanimous verdicts, on the other hand, give juries the choice to 
ignore the memories of two of their peers and limits the jury members’ 
ability to confront their own implicit biases through group discussion. 
Ultimately, this impacts the jury’s ability to function as a jury—that is, 
to ensure that the State is not arbitrarily punishing citizens without 
sufficient evidence. As the Supreme Court explained in 1896, a 
criminal defendant starts “with the presumption of innocence in his 
favor. That stays with him until it is driven out of the case . . . when the 
evidence shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the crime as charged 
has been committed.”237 In Oregon and Louisiana, however, the State 
need only convince eighty-three percent of the jurors (ten of twelve) in 
order to “drive out” this presumption of innocence.238 
The Supreme Court theorized in Apodaca that a majority of the jury 
would carefully consider the objections of minority jurors before 
overruling minority opinions.239 Jury operation in practice, which is 
carefully screened off from the public, makes the practical effect of 
Apodaca hard to identify or prove. Although jury data on 
nonunanimous juries is sparse, the next case example illustrates how 
the nonunanimous verdict rule can affect the jury. 
In 2016, an Oregon jury reached a nonunanimous verdict to convict 
Olan Jermaine Williams, a black male accused of two counts of 
sodomy in the first degree, over the objections of the only black 
juror.240 Mr. Williams is a married Howard University graduate with a 
Master’s Degree.241 The jury was composed of three men and nine 
women; nine of the jurors were white, two were Asian, and one juror 
was black.242 
After hearing the State’s evidence against Mr. Williams, the jury 
quickly and unanimously voted Mr. Williams not guilty as to the 
second count. On the first count however, relating to the performance 
 
237 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 500 (1896). 
238 Esman, supra note 2. 
239 Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 413 (1972). 
240 Sentencing Transcript at 469, State v. Williams, No. 15 CR 58698 (2016) (on file with 
the author). 
241 Trial Transcript at 311, 366, State v. Williams, No. 15 CR 58698 (2016) (on file with 
the author). 
242 E-mail from Ryan Scott, attorney for Mr. Williams, to author (Aug. 25, 2016, 16:04 
PST) (on file with author); e-mail from Ryan Scott, attorney for Mr. Williams, to author 
(Sept. 6, 2016, 13:32 PST) (on file with author). 
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of oral sex, the jury split: eight jurors believed Mr. Williams to be 
guilty, three jurors believed Mr. Williams to be innocent, and one was 
on the fence. After some deliberation, the jury split 9–3.243 
In the next four hours of deliberation, the majority jurors mainly 
focused on swaying the only black juror. One white juror in the 
majority did not find the black defendant credible. One Asian juror told 
the black juror that in believing and advocating for the defendant’s 
innocence, the black juror was condoning rape in general.244 
When the court clerk came in to ask when the jury would be back 
the next day in order to finish deliberating, the majority jurors began 
focusing their efforts on reaching enough of a consensus (10–2) to 
avoid returning the next day.245 The black juror and one white juror 
remained steadfast that the defendant was innocent.246 Another juror 
expressed that she did not wish to come back the next day, and could 
not stay late because of her childcare arrangement; she switched her 
vote.247 Because of this last minute swing vote, pressured by majority 
jurors, and the nonunanimous verdict rule in Oregon, Mr. Williams is 
now a convicted sex offender who will spend time in prison.248 
V 
CONTINUED RELIANCE ON APODACA RISKS WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS 
Nonunanimous jury guilty verdicts create an unacceptable risk of 
convicting the innocent. At the time of writing this Article, there are 
1888 known exonerations in the United States; these are cases in which 






247 Sentencing Transcript at 469, State v. Williams, No. 15 CR 58698 (2016) (on file with 
the author). 
248 Id. Mr. Williams brought a motion for new trial in circuit court arguing that as applied 
to his trial, Oregon’s nonunanimous jury rule violated his rights under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Williams, 15 CR 58698 at 
5−6 (order denying a new trial) (on file with the author). Although the court ultimately ruled 
that it could not grant a new trial because of the defendant’s failure to articulate a remedy 
sufficient to prevent a similar occurrence in a subsequent jury trial and on other evidentiary 
grounds, it addressed the long history of racial discrimination in the Oregon criminal justice 
system, id. at 8–15, and found that “race and ethnicity was a motivating factor in the passage 
of [the nonunanimous jury rule in Oregon],” id. at 16. 
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charges based on new evidence of innocence.249 These documented 
cases provide valuable information about the causes of wrongful 
conviction; which include eyewitness misidentification, false 
confessions, invalidated or improper science, inadequate defense, and 
government misconduct.250 In each of these cases, there are a variety 
of factors that led to each wrongful conviction from mistakes to 
intentional wrongdoing to issues of race and class.251 Unless 
significant changes are made to our criminal justice system, these 
system failures will continue to contribute to criminal defendants, 
especially those who are poor, being wrongfully convicted.252 
Due to Oregon and Louisiana’s nonunanimous jury rules, defendants 
in these states also face the added possibility of being convicted of a 
crime they did not commit. While having a unanimous jury does not 
automatically ensure that an innocent person will not be wrongfully 
convicted, a nonunanimous jury certainly eliminates the most obvious 
scenario of preventing a wrongful conviction: that someone on the jury 
believes in the defendant’s innocence or that the State has not met its 
burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt. In the forty-eight 
other states, having a unanimous jury could prevent a wrongful 
conviction from occurring at trial. A majority verdict not only deprives 
a defendant from being spared by the one or two jurors believing in 
either his innocence or that the State has not met its burden, but it also 
deprives the jurors of having their dissenting voices count as a 
safeguard against unreliable evidence, government misconduct and/or 
system failures. As discussed above, it is difficult to understand how a 
 
249 Exoneration Registry, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law 
.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/featured.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 2017); Glossary, 
THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration 
/Pages/glossary.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
250 Glossary, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu 
/special/exoneration/Pages/glossary.aspx. 
251 Exonerations by Race and Crime, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ExonerationsRaceByCrime.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 5, 2017); Basic Patterns, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Basic-Patterns.aspx (last visited Feb. 
5, 2017). 
252 Gideon’s Broken Promise: America’s Continuing Quest for Equal Justice, 2004 
A.B.A STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS 3–4, 7 (2004), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defen 
dants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_execsummary.authcheckdam.pdf (reporting that thousands suspects 
who are unable to afford lawyers are wrongly convicted because they are pressured into plea 
deals or have incompetent representation). 
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jury can meet the standard of “guilty proof beyond a reasonable doubt” 
when one or two jurors find reasonable doubt in the State’s case. 
In Oregon, one of the ten documented exonerations was based on a 
nonunanimous jury conviction.253 In 1999, Pamela Reser was 
convicted by a nonunanimous jury of seventeen counts of first-degree 
rape, eight counts of sodomy, and four counts of first-degree sex abuse, 
as a result of allegations made by her own children.254 She was 
sentenced to 116 years in prison.255 In 2002, two of her children 
recanted to their foster parent, which spurred a new investigation into 
the case by the Oregon State Police.256 Ultimately, all four children 
recanted and passed polygraph tests.257 After the State and the 
defendant filed a joint motion for a new trial, the charges against Ms. 
Reser were dismissed, and she was released from prison.258 
Interestingly, while not convicted by a nonunanimous jury, Oregon 
exoneree Christopher Boots’ case is precedent setting in the area of jury 
concurrence.259 As noted above, article I, section 11, of the Oregon 
Constitution260 requires that, for crimes other than first-degree/capital 
murder, at least ten jurors must agree on the factual occurrences that 
constitute the crime in order to render a guilty verdict.261 As a result, 
when the State has presented evidence of multiple specific incidents 
that could support a charge against a defendant, the court must instruct 
the jury on “the necessity of agreement on all material elements of a 
charge in order to convict.”262 The required instruction is often referred 
to as a concurrence or “Boots ” instruction.263 
 
253 Exoneration Detail List, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www 
.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx?View={FAF6EDDB-5A68-4F8F 
-8A52-2C61F5BF9EA7}&FilterField1=ST&FilterValue1=OR (last visited Feb. 5, 2017); 
OR. INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://ojrc.info/oregon-innocence-project/ (last visited Feb. 5, 
2017). Importantly, most of the Oregon exonerees were not subject to nonunanimous juries 
at trial because of the seriousness of the crimes involved. 
254 Pamela Sue Reser, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich 





259 See State v. Boots, 780 P.2d 725, 731 (Or. 1989). 
260 OR. CONST. art. I, § 11 (2015). 
261 State v. Rodriguez-Castillo, 151 P.3d 931, 940 (Or. Ct. App. 2007), rev’d, 188 P.3d 
268 (Or. 2008). 
262 State v. Lotches, 17 P.3d 1045, 1057 (Or. 2000). 
263 See Boots, 780 P.2d at 728 (explaining the concurrence requirement). 
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In 1983, Mr. Boots was arrested and charged with murder and first-
degree robbery as a result of the death of a nineteen-year-old 
convenience store clerk.264 These charges were dropped due to 
insufficient evidence.265 The case was reopened a few years later and 
he was subsequently tried and convicted of aggravated murder in 1987; 
he was sentenced to life in prison.266 Mr. Boots was charged with 
aggravated murder based on two different theories: (1) that he 
committed the homicide in the course of committing robbery in the first 
degree, and (2) that he committed the homicide to conceal the identity 
of the perpetrators of the robbery.267 At trial, the court instructed the 
jury that it was not necessary for them to agree on the theory of 
aggravated murder.268 The Oregon Supreme Court however concluded 
that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that their agreement was 
not required: 
Like the “reasonable doubt” standard, which was found to be an 
indispensable element in all criminal trials in In re Winship, the 
unanimous jury requirement “impresses on the trier of fact the 
necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude on the facts in 
issue.” The unanimity rule thus requires jurors to be in substantial 
agreement as to just what a defendant did as a step preliminary to 
determining whether the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. 
Requiring the vote of twelve jurors to convict a defendant does little 
to insure that his right to a unanimous verdict is protected unless this 
prerequisite of jury consensus as to the defendant’s course of action 
is also required.269 
Interestingly, in reaching its decision, the Oregon Supreme Court 
spoke passionately about both the reasonable doubt standard and 
unanimous jury requirement. Following the 1989 ruling, Boots was 
retried (in a limited trial) and convicted of aggravated murder by a 
 
264 Christopher Boots, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich 
.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3034 (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
265 Id. 
266 State v. Boots, 767 P.2d 450, 450 (Or. Ct. App), rev’d, 780 P.2d 725 (Or. 1989). 
267 Boots, 780 P.2d at 727. 
268 Id. 
269 Id. at 730–31 (quoting United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453, 457−58 (5th Cir. 1977)) 
(internal citations omitted). Accordingly, in distinguishing between facts that require jury 
agreement and those that do not, the Court explained: “We are not speaking here of factual 
details, such as whether a gun was a revolver or a pistol and whether it was held in the right 
or the left hand. We deal with facts that the law (or the indictment) has made essential to a 
crime.” Id. at 730. 
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unanimous jury.270 Mr. Boots was exonerated in 1995 after the real 
killer confessed to the murder in a recorded conversation with a police 
informant, and DNA testing led to a reinvestigation of the case, which 
revealed he was convicted based on shoddy forensics.271 
Unlike in Oregon, in Louisiana, “a jury is not constitutionally 
required to agree on a single theory to convict a defendant where it is 
instructed as to alternative theories. Thus, a conviction can be upheld 
if there is sufficient evidence based on either of the alternate theories 
with which the jury is charged.”272 Of the forty cases in Louisiana that 
have resulted in exonerations, twenty of them were tried in a manner 
that allowed conviction by nonunanimous jury verdicts.273 In nine of 
these twenty cases, the guilty verdict was returned by a nonunanimous 
jury and these nine individuals served a total of 131.5 years of hard 
labor for crimes they did not commit.274 In at least these nine cases, 
nonunanimous verdicts allowed jurors who justifiably did not vote to 
convict the defendant to be overruled by the majority. While it is 
impossible to say how the outcome would have changed had the jury 
been required to reach a unanimous verdict, it is clear that the 
nonunanimous verdict rule played a role in their wrongful conviction. 
 
270 Christopher Boots, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich 
.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3034 (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
271 Id. 
272 State v. Patorno, 822 So. 2d 141, 149 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (internal citations omitted). 
273 State v. Cheryl Beridone, Terrebone Parish Case No. 78,042; State v. Gene Bibben, 
East Baton Rouge Parish Case No. 2-87-979; State v. Gregory Bright, Orleans Parish Case 
No. 252-514; State v. Earl Truvia, Orleans Parish Case No. 252-514; State v. Dennis Brown, 
St. Tammany Parish Case No. 128-634; State v. Gerald Burge, St. Tammany Parish Case 
No. 147,175; State v. Vernon Chapman, St. Tammany Parish Case No. 71,385; State v. 
Clyde Charles, Terrebonne Parish Case No. 106,980; State v. Glenn Davis, Jefferson Parish 
Case No. 92-4541; State v. Larry Delmore, Jefferson Parish Case No. 92-4541; State v. 
Terrence Meyers, Jefferson Parish Case No. 92-4541; State v. Douglas Dilosa, Jefferson 
Parish Case No. 87-105; State v. Travis Hayes, Jefferson Parish Case No. 97-3780; State v. 
Willie Jackson, Jefferson Parish Case No. 87-205; State v. Henry James, Jefferson Parish 
Case No. 81-4366; State v. Anthony Johnson, Washington Parish Case No. 89-CRC-39701; 
State v. Craig Johnson, Orleans Parish Case No. 380-395; State v. Rickey Johnson, Sabine 
Parish Case No. 30,770; State v. John Thompson, Orleans Parish Case No. 306-526; State 
v. Michael Anthony Williams, Jackson Parish Case No. 20,387. Out of the twenty 
remaining, thirteen were tried as first degree murder cases and thus were not eligible for 
nonunanimous juries, four had bench trials, and two pled guilty. Brief of Innocence Project 
New Orleans as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 11, Jackson v. Louisiana, 134 S. 
Ct. 1950 (2014) (No.13-1105). 
274 Brief of Innocence Project New Orleans as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 273, at 12; e-mail from Emily Maw, Director, Innocence Project New Orleans, 
to Aliza Kaplan (June 13, 2016, 17:16 PDT) (on file with author). 
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For example, a nonunanimous jury convicted Rickie Johnson in 
1983 and sentenced him to life in prison without parole.275 Tests 
conducted by the Shreveport Crime Lab determined that evidence 
collected from the victim included sperm from the perpetrator, and 
serological testing showed that Johnson—and thirty-five percent of the 
African American population—could have been the contributor.276 
The victim also identified Johnson as the perpetrator, even though he 
had a prominent gold tooth that was never part of her description of her 
attacker.277 In 2008, after serving twenty-five years in prison, Johnson 
became the first person exonerated based on mini-STR technology, 
which allows labs to accurately test degraded or small samples of 
DNA.278 
In 1986, Gene Bibbins was convicted by a nonunanimous jury of the 
aggravated rape of a teenage woman in Baton Rouge. Bibbins, who 
lived in the same apartment complex as the victim, was found near the 
scene of the crime with a radio belonging to the victim, which he had 
coincidently found outside, in between their buildings.279 The police 
brought him to the apartment building where the crime occurred; he 
remained in the car with a flashlight illuminating his face while the 
victim identified him.280 The State relied heavily on this identification 
at trial.281 At the time of the crime, Bibbins could not be excluded by 
the limited DNA technology available. However, sixteen years later in 
2002, Bibbins became the first inmate in Louisiana to gain access to 
biological evidence under the State’s post-conviction DNA testing 
statute.282 This new testing exonerated Bibbins.283 
In 1993, Glenn Davis, Larry Delmore, and Terrence Meyers were 
convicted of second-degree murder by a nonunanimous jury verdict, 
and sentenced to life in prison without parole.284 Their convictions 
 
275 Rickie Johnson, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT (2016), http://www.innocenceproject.org 




279 Gene Bibbins, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT (2016), http://www.innocenceproject.org 





284 Larry Delmore, INNOCENCE PROJECT NEW ORLEANS, http://www.ip-no.org/exon 
oree-profile/larry-delmore (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
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were based on the testimony of just one witness, who identified them 
as the perpetrators and also admitted to have smoked crack an hour 
before the crime occurred.285 The defendants were convicted despite 
two of the jurors finding reasonable doubt in the witness’ credibility.286 
In 2004, the three men were released on bond shortly after the 
discovery of exculpatory evidence, including the confession of the real 
killer.287 An appellate court set aside the verdicts and ordered a new 
trial.288 The State eventually dismissed all charges against the trio in 
2010, after they had served more than seventeen years in prison.289 
These are just a few examples of the known individuals who were 
convicted by nonunanimous juries and proven innocent years later. 
Likely, there have been other innocent people who were convicted by 
nonunanimous juries in Oregon and Louisiana, but unfortunately, they 
will probably not be able to prove their innocence. In general, it is 
extremely difficult for a wrongfully convicted person to prove his 
innocence by simply arguing that he is innocent. In fact, without DNA 
evidence that directly proves innocence, even in cases that involve the 
known causes of wrongful conviction,290 the likelihood of a court 
actually reviewing a claim for innocence is exceedingly rare.291 So, not 
only are defendants convicted by nonunanimous juries in Oregon and 
Louisiana facing convictions that they may not have received in forty-
eight states, if they are innocent, they will have a hard time proving it. 
Unlike some of the other causes contributing to wrongful conviction, 
the nonunanimous verdict rule is easily identifiable and could be 
eliminated without prejudicing the State. Furthermore, arguments 
 
285 Id. 
286 Kyle R. Satterfield, Circumventing Apodaca: An Equal Protection Challenge to 
Nonunanimous Jury Verdicts in Louisiana, 90 TUL. L. REV. 693, 703 (2016). “Both of the 
jurors who did not vote for conviction were black and were two of only three black jurors 
serving on the jury.” Id. 
287 Glenn Davis, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu 
/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3158 (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
288 Id. 
289 Id. 
290 The known causes of wrongful convictions are eyewitness misidentification, junk 
science, false confessions, government misconduct, snitches, and bad lawyering. Causes of 
Wrongful Convictions, UNIV. OF MICH., https://www.law.umich.edu/clinical/innocence 
clinic/Pages/wrongfulconvictions.aspx. (last accessed Feb. 5, 2017). 
291 In 2011, Professor Brandon Garrett examined whether judicial remedies helped 250 
of the first DNA exonerees. He found that of those who challenged their convictions in court 
prior to DNA testing, more than ninety percent failed. BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING 
THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (Harvard Univ. Press 2012). 
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concerning efficiency fall short in the face of the tragedy of 
imprisoning an innocent person. 
VI 
THE NONUNANIMOUS VERDICT RULE FURTHER HARMS MINORITIES 
ALREADY EXPERIENCING DISCRIMINATION IN OREGON’S CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 
According to Justice Stewart, dissenting in Johnson v. Louisiana, a 
further problem with nonunanimous juries is that the jurors in the 
majority “can simply ignore the views of their fellow panel members 
of a different race or class.”292 As discussed above, the original 
purposes of Oregon’s nonunanimous rule was in fact to silence the 
views of minorities and make it easier to convict defendants—while 
demographics may have changed some, these original intentions are 
still at play today. 
Historically, in Oregon and around the country, minorities were 
denied the opportunity to sit on juries293 and more recently, studies 
show that discrimination still exists in Oregon’s criminal justice 
system, including its jury system. For example, in the 1990s, an Oregon 
study acknowledged that “[t]oo few minorities are called for jury duty, 
and even fewer minorities actually serve on Oregon juries” and that 
“[p]eremptory challenges . . . are used solely because of the race or 
ethnic background of prospective jurors.”294 And as discussed above, 
studies support that nonunanimous juries make it likely that minority 
jury members’ viewpoints can easily be silenced.295 But even when 
Oregon prosecutors comply with the law296 by permitting blacks and 
 
292 Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 397 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
293 Rose Jade, Voter Registration Status as a Jury Service Employment Test: Oregon’s 
Retracted Endorsement Following Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 
Inc., 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 557, 562–74 (2003); Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. 
Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 
884–85 (1994). 
294 THE OREGON SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL/ETHNIC ISSUES IN THE 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM, MAY 1994 REPORT (1994), http://courts.oregon.gov/OJD/docs/osca 
/cpsd/courtimprovement/access/rac_eth_tfr.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2017) [hereinafter 1994 
REPORT]. 
295 AM. BAR ASS’N, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS WITH COMMENTARY 24 
(2005), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/american_jury/final 
_commentary_july_1205.authcheckdam.pdf (“A non-unanimous decision rule allows juries 
to reach a quorum without seriously considering minority voices, thereby effectively 
silencing those voices and negating their participation.”). 
296 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); 1994 REPORT, supra note 294. 
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other minority citizens to serve as jurors, due to the nonunanimous jury 
rule, a majority of jurors can still easily dismiss the votes of minority 
jurors should they vote against conviction. Oregon not only has a 
population with few racial and ethnic minorities and a history of 
institutionalized racism, it also has documented structural racial 
disparity in its criminal justice system.297 Allowing nonunanimous jury 
verdicts not only contributes to perpetuating the structural racism in 
Oregon’s criminal justice system, but it leaves little faith in our 
deliberative jury process. 
Understanding how the nonunanimous jury rule contributes to 
perpetuating structural racism in Oregon requires an appreciation of the 
state’s tarnished history in regards to systemic racial prejudices—this 
history is deep and covers all aspects of society.298 As not to stray too 
far off the subject of criminal justice, here are some historical 
highlights. In 1859, Oregon became the only state admitted to the 
Union with an exclusion law written into the state’s constitution, which 
prevented African Americans from settling or owning property in the 
state.299 In 1868, the Oregon legislature rescinded their ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.300 In 
1883, Oregonians voted down an amendment that would have granted 
black suffrage, despite the fact that the issue had already been rendered 
moot by the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.301 
As noted above, in 1922, following World War I and an influx in 
minority communities in Oregon, the Ku Klux Klan was formed.302 
Throughout the 1920s Klan membership flourished and its influence 
grew in Oregon.303 In 1926, with the passage of Measure 3, Oregonians 
finally voted to remove the exclusionary language from the Bill of 
 
297 See 1994 REPORT, supra note 294. 
298 For a good and recent article about discriminatory practices in Oregon outside the 
criminal justice system, see Alana Semuels, The Racist History of Portland, the Whitest City 
in America, THE ATLANTIC (July 22, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive 
/2016/07/racist-history-portland/492035/. 
299 OR. CONST. art. I, § 35 (1857). 
300 Douglas H. Bryant, Unorthodox and Paradox: Revisiting the Ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 53 ALA. L. REV. 555, 564 (2002). 
301 Diversity & Inclusion: Making Us Stronger—1638-1899, OREGON STATE BAR, 
https://storywall.osbar.org/1638-1899/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
302 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
303 David Horowitz, Social Morality and Personal Revitalization: Oregon’s Ku Klux 
Klan in the 1920s, 90 OR. HIST. Q. 4, 365, 369 (1989). 
KAPLAN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/2017  6:37 PM 
2016] Overturning Apodaca v. Oregon Should Be Easy: Nonunanimous 45 
Jury Verdicts in Criminal Cases Undermine the Credibility of Our Justice System 
Rights in the Oregon Constitution.304 In addition to these major 
instances of systemic inequities, the time period from statehood until 
the 1950s was checkered with segregation, anti-miscegenation, 
indigenous relocation, racially discriminatory taxes, redlining, property 
ownership restrictions, and the list goes on.305 
The late 1950s saw the beginning of the elimination of statutory 
discrimination with, among others, the passage of the Oregon Fair 
Housing Act, the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, and 
desegregation orders.306 However, many unofficial discriminatory 
practices still persisted. For example, many cities and towns in Oregon 
had “Sundown Laws” which warned blacks and people of color to be 
out of town by sundown.307 Additionally, even though redlining rules 
had been officially removed from the Oregon Real Estate code, many 
of those practices were unofficially continued for decades.308 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, urban decay took its hold on 
Portland’s minority communities, as was the case for many cities in the 
United States at the time.309 These areas experienced a significant 
decline in standard of living and an increase in crime and gang 
activity.310 
In 1973, Oregon legislators noticed, surprisingly, that the state had 
never officially ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.311 Subsequently, 
as a result of the hard work of William McCoy, the first African 
American elected to the Oregon Legislature, House Joint Resolution 13 
passed overwhelmingly, and Oregon officially ratified the Fourteenth 
 
304 Oregon Repeal on Forbiddance on “Free Negro and Mullato” People, Measure 3 
(1926), BALLOTOPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Repeal_of_Forbiddance_on_%22 
Free_Negro_and_Mullato%22_People,_Measure_3_(1926) (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
305 Elaine Rector, Looking Back in Order to Move Forward: An Often Untold History 
Affecting Oregon’s Past, Present, and Future, THE CITY OF PORTLAND BUREAU OF 
PLANNING AND SUSTAINABILITY, https://www.portlandoregon.gov/bps/article/412697 (last 
revised May 16, 2010). 
306 Id. 
307 Alex Notman, Oregon’s Hidden History Exposed, EUGENE WKLY., Feb. 27, 2014, 
http://eugeneweekly.com/20140227/news-briefs/oregon%E2%80%99s-hidden-history          
-exposed. 
308 Dr. Mark Strong, Displacement in North and Northeast Portland—An Historical 
Overview, PORTLAND HOUSING BUREAU, https://www.portlandoregon.gov/phb/article/51 
7236 (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
309 It is important to note that the vast majority of people of color living in Oregon, lived 
and continue to live in Portland. 
310 Id. 
311 Cheryl A. Brooks, Race, Politics, and Denial: Why Oregon Forgot to Ratify the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 OR. L. REV. 731, 752 (2004). 
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Amendment on May 21, 1973.312 However, this ratification was never 
officially reported, as the historical notes in the annotated United States 
Code only note the rescission and not the ratification.313 More recent 
studies314 show that “black families lag far behind whites in the 
Portland region in employment, health outcomes, and high-school 
graduation rates. They also lag behind black families nationally.”315 
Minorities have fared similarly in Oregon’s criminal justice system. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, following the same parallels as the 
rest of the country, the Oregon constituency and the Oregon Legislature 
began passing “tough on crime” laws.316 These laws have had 
disproportionately negative direct and indirect effects on people of 
color around the country, including Oregon.317 In 1988, Measure 4 was 
passed which required full sentences without parole or probation for 
certain felonies.318 In 1994, Measures 10 and 11 were passed, which 
required mandatory minimum sentences for certain offenses and 
restricted the legislature’s ability to reduce voter approved sentence 
without a two-thirds vote.319 In 1997, Measure 49 passed, which 
amended the constitution to state that inmates have no legal right, and 
no legally enforceable cause of action, to a job or work, or training and 
 
312 Id. at 752−53. 
313 Id. at 754. 
314 See generally L. BATES, A. CURRY-STEVENS & COAL. OF CMTYS OF COLOR, THE 
AFRICAN-AMERICAN COMMUNITY IN MULTNOMAH COUNTY: AN UNSETTLING PROFILE 
(2014), http://static1.squarespace.com/static/5501f6d4e4b0ee23fb3097ff/t/556d3996e4b09 
da5e9a521df/1433221526152/African-American-report-FINAL-January-2014.pdf. 
315 Semuels, supra note 298. 
316 For example, Oregon passed Ballot Measure 11 in 1994, establishing mandatory 
minimum sentencing for some crimes. 
317 Carrie Johnson, 20 Years Later, Parts Of Major Crime Bill Viewed As Terrible 
Mistake, NPR (Sept. 12, 2014, 3:32 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/09/12/347736999/20      
-years-later-major-crime-bill-viewed-as-terrible-mistake; CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE 
& P’SHIP FOR SAFETY AND JUSTICE, MISGUIDED MEASURES: THE OUTCOMES AND 
IMPACTS OF MEASURE 11 ON OREGON’S YOUTH 39–50 (2011), http://www.campaignfor 
youthjustice.org/documents/Misguided_Measures_July_2011.pdf. 
318 Oregon Certain Felons to Serve Full Sentences, Measure 4 (1988), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Certain_Felons_to_Serve_Full_Sentences,_Measure_4_(19
88) (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
319 Oregon Legislature Cannot Reduce Voter-Approved Sentence Without 
Supermajority, Measure 10 (1994), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Oregon 
_Legislature_Cannot_Reduce_Voter-Approved_Sentence_Without_Supermajority, 
_Measure_10_(1994) (last visited Feb. 5, 2017); Oregon Certain Felons to Serve Full 
Sentences, Measure 4 (1988), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Mandatory 
_Sentences_for_Listed_Felonies,_Measure_11_(1994) (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
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educational programs.320 In 1999 a few measures were passed: 
Measure 71 limited a judge’s discretion in pretrial release decisions;321 
Measure 74 constitutionally adopted 1988’s Measures 3 and 4;322 and 
Measure 75 restricted people from serving on grand juries and criminal 
trial juries that either had a felony conviction in the past fifteen years 
or certain misdemeanor convictions in the past five years.323 Finally, 
in 2008, Measure 57 increased sentences for high-quantity or repeat 
drug crimes and repeat property crimes under certain circumstances.324 
These crimes are usually committed by people using drugs, and not 
drug traffickers.325 
In 1989, the Oregon Supreme Court Chief Justice Edwin Peterson 
attended a national conference for state supreme court chief justices 
where he saw many of his colleagues report on racial bias and 
inequities in their jurisdictions.326 This spurred Justice Peterson to 
establish his own task force on racial/ethnic issues in Oregon’s judicial 
system.327 This task force released a comprehensive report in May 
1994.328 Some of the major findings of that task force included: too 
few minorities are called for jury duty, and even fewer minorities 
actually serve on Oregon juries; peremptory challenges are used solely 
because of the race or ethnic background of prospective jurors; in the 
criminal justice area, the evidence suggests that, as compared to other 
similarly situated non-minorities, minorities are more likely to be 
 
320 Oregon State Prisoner Employees’ Rights and Interstate Commerce, Measure 49 
(May 1997), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_State_Prisoner_Employees 
%27_Rights_and_Interstate_Commerce,_Measure_49_(May_1997) (last visited Feb. 5, 
2017). 
321 Oregon Limited Pretrial Release of Accused Violent Felons, Measure 71 (1999), 
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Limited_Pretrial_Release_of_Accused 
_Violent_Felons,_Measure_71_(1999) (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
322 Oregon Term of Imprisonment to be Fully Served, Measure 74 (1999), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Term_of_Imprisonment_to_be_Fully_Served,_Measure_7
4_(1999) (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
323 Oregon Felons Banned from Serving on Juries, Measure 75 (1999), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Felons_Banned_from_Serving_on_Juries,_Measure_75_(1
999) (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
324 Oregon Criminal Sentence, Measure 57 (2008), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia 
.org/Oregon_Criminal_Sentence,_Measure_57_(2008) (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
325 List of Oregon Ballot Measures, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/List_of 
_Oregon_ballot_measures (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
326 Casey Parks, Oregon State Bar Diversity: Racial Bias Report ‘true today just as it 
was in 1994,’ Chief Justice says, THE OREGONIAN (Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.oregonlive 
.com/portland/index.ssf/2015/01/oregon_state_bar_diversity_rac.html. 
327 Id. 
328 1994 REPORT, supra note 294. 
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arrested, charged, convicted and incarcerated, and less likely to be 
released on bail or put on probation.329 The task force also 
recommended that an implementation committee be formed that would 
oversee the implementation of the recommendations made by the task 
force.330 This Committee met and released progress reports through 
2006.331 A close look at these progress reports reveals that no 
substantive progress was made in the implementation of the 
recommendations.332 
One major area addressed in the 1994 report was minority 
representation on juries.333 This is a major issue in the discussion of 
fairness and nonunanimous juries. In the report, Recommendation 7-1 
stated that the Chief Justice should increase the number of minorities 
on the source list and implement changes permissible under the law.334 
In the Implementation Progress Report, released in 1996, 
Recommendation 7-1 was determined to be unnecessary in the future 
because the lack of minority representation on juries was more directly 
related to the summons process and juror experience.335 As a result, the 
Implementation Committee turned its focus toward helping draft and 
support legislation that would improve juror experiences by increasing 
compensation, providing compensation for childcare, and providing 
travel reimbursements. Unfortunately, the Legislature was not on the 
 
329 Id. 
330 Id. at 2. 
331 The Oregon Supreme Court then established the Oregon Supreme Court 
Implementation Committee to oversee implementation of the recommendations of 
the Racial/Ethnic Issues Task Force. The Implementation Committee worked from 
June 1994 to January 1996 to determine the status of each task force 
recommendation. Committee members met with all justice system entities to 
which the Task Force directed its recommendations and offered its help. First and 
foremost, the Implementation Committee recommended that the Oregon Judicial 
Department take responsibility for coordinating a long-term effort to monitor 
implementation, collect data, and help initiate new programs to implement Task 
Force recommendations. To this end, Chief Justice Carson established the Access 
to Justice for All Committee in March 1997. 
OR. JUDICIAL DEP’T, ABOUT THE ACCESS COMMITTEE, http://courts.oregon.gov/OJD 
/OSCA/cpsd/courtimprovement/access/pages/aboutus.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
332 OR. JUDICIAL DEP’T, ACCESS COMMITTEE PROGRESS UPDATES, http://courts.oregon 
.gov/OJD/OSCA/cpsd/courtimprovement/access/pages/progress.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 
2017). 
333 See 1994 REPORT, supra note 294, at ch.7. 
334 Id. at 75. 
335 OR. JUDICIAL DEP’T, OREGON SUPREME COURT IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE: A 
COMMITMENT TO FAIRNESS at 128 (Jan. 1996), http://courts.oregon.gov/OJD/docs/osca 
/cpsd/courtimprovement/access/ic_report.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2017) [hereinafter 1996 
PROGRESS REPORT]. 
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same page and many of these legislative efforts failed.336 Given that it 
has been over twenty years since the initial findings and the progress 
reports findings were published, it appears that a reevaluation of our 
system is well over due. 
This year, the Racial and Ethnic Disparities (RED) Report, which 
compared the experiences of minorities to that of whites in Multnomah 
County’s (Portland) criminal justice system found that black people are 
overrepresented in each stage of the county’s adult criminal justice 
system.337 The RED Report shows that those disparities are highest 
among blacks and Latinos.338 Some of the Report’s findings included: 
blacks are 4.2 times more likely to be referred to the district attorney 
and they are less likely to receive a citation in place of arrest.339 Blacks 
are also 4.1 times more likely to have their case accepted for 
prosecution than whites.340 Blacks are 4.1 times more likely to have 
their case continued.341 Blacks and Native Americans are less likely to 
have their cases dismissed than whites, the difference being most 
significant for Native Americans. In addition, blacks and Native 
Americans are more likely to receive a conviction than whites.342 
Blacks are 7 times more likely to be sentenced to prison, 4.3 times more 
likely to be sentenced to jail, 3.7 times more likely to be sentenced to 
probation, 3.7 times more likely to have a conditional discharge, and 4 
times more likely to have a monetary judgment, than whites.343 Finally, 
 
336 OR. JUDICIAL DEP’T, ACCESS COMMITTEE PROGRESS UPDATES, http://courts.oregon 
.gov/OJD/OSCA/cpsd/courtimprovement/access/pages/progress.aspx (last Feb. 5, 2017). 
For example, today juror daily compensation is as follows: Days 1&2 = $10/day, 3rd & 
Subsequent = $25/day. OR. REV. STAT. § 10.061 (2015). Previously, the Implementation 
Committee had gotten the legislature to agree to an increase in 2001, but that increase was 
cut short as a result of a financial crisis, that rate was as follows: Days 1&2 = $10/day, 3rd 
& Subsequent = # of hours x statutory min. wage, not be less than $10/day and not to be 
more than $50/day. So, from 1953 to 1971 the rate was $7.50/day and from 1971 to 2001 
the rate was $10/day. Also, mileage reimbursement has not changed since 1953, which is 
.08 cents a day. OR. REV. STAT. § 10.065 (2015). 
337 SAFETY AND JUSTICE CHALLENGE, RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES AND THE 
RELATIVE RATE INDEX (RRI), at 7 (2016), http://www.aclu-or.org/sites/default/files/RED 
_Report_Mult_Co.pdf. 
338 ACLU OF OREGON, Damning Report Reveals Racial and Ethnic Disparities in 
Multnomah County’s Criminal Justice System (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.aclu-or.org 
/content/damning-report-reveals-racial-and-ethnic-disparities-multnomah-county%E2% 
80%99s-criminal-justice-sys (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
339 SAFETY AND JUSTICE CHALLENGE, supra note 337. 
340 Id. at 11. 
341 Id. at 18. 
342 Id. at 19. 
343 Id. at 26. 
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blacks are more likely to receive a parole or probation violation that 
results in a jail stay than whites.344 Also this year, a report published 
by The Sentencing Project345 found that African Americans are 
incarcerated by the states at five times the rate of whites across the 
nation.346 In Oregon, the ratio is slightly higher: 5.6 to 1.347 In fact, in 
Oregon in 2014, one in twenty-one of all African American adult males 
were in prison.348 Oregon has the seventh-highest incarceration rate of 
African Americans in the nation.349 
Unfortunately, these results should not be too surprising considering 
that they are not much different than the overall findings of the Oregon 
Supreme Court’s 1994 Oregon Task Force on Racial/Ethnic Issues in 
the Judicial System. In fact, Chief Justice Edwin Peterson, who led the 
1994 Task Force, recently acknowledged that, “It’s true today just as it 
was in 1994.”350 Peterson explained, “If you look at arrest rates, search 
rates, pretrial release rates, rate of conviction and rate of persons put on 
probation, people of color continue to represent a disproportionately 
large group of people who suffer from the disparity in these various 
rates.”351 
The historical trauma of economic and cultural discrimination that 
people of color have faced throughout the entirety of Oregon’s history 
continues to permeate through our schools, housing, policing, and 
criminal justice system.352 Both the RED Report and The Sentencing 
Project report show clearly that racial discrimination continues to be 
commonplace and pervasive today. As “Oregon has been slow to 
dismantle racist policies,”353 allowing nonunanimous juries is just one 
more policy that contributes to the systemic inequities that persist in 
Oregon today. Not only do nonunanimous juries silence minority 
 
344 Id. at 27–30. It is yet to be announced whether any sort of follow-up committee or 
policy changes will be enacted as a result of this report, let alone whether anything would 
come of it. 
345 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS (2016), http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/color 
-of-justice-racial-and-ethnic-disparity-in-state-prisons/. 
346 Id. at 3, Key Findings Section. 
347 Id. at 17, tbl.C. 
348 Id. at 5, tbl.2. 
349 Id. 
350 Parks, supra note 326. 
351 Id. 
352 See Semuels, supra note 298; Daniel Donner, Oregon’s Not-so-Pretty Racist Past is 
not yet History, DAILY KOS ELECTIONS (Jan. 23, 2015, 10:33 AM), http://www.dailykos 
.com/story/2015/1/23/1359413/-Oregon-s-not-so-pretty-past-is-not-yet-history. 
353 BATES, CURRY-STEVENS & COAL. OF CMTYS. OF COLOR, supra note 314. 
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viewpoints, but for black (and other minority) criminal defendants in 
Oregon (and Louisiana), it separates them from defendants in the forty-
eight other states by preventing hold-out jurors from sparing those 
defendants believed innocent or preventing conviction when the 
government has not made its case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should revisit the holding in Apodaca that 
allows nonunanimous verdicts in state criminal trials. As discussed 
above, Court’s recent jurisprudence contradicts its 1972 Apodaca and 
Johnson rulings under the doctrine of incorporation. Specifically, 
applying the Court’s 2010 McDonald v. City of Chicago incorporation 
approach to Oregon and Louisiana’s nonunanimous jury laws signifies 
that overturning Apodaca should be easy, and in fact suggests that the 
Court should incorporate the few unincorporated provisions of the Bill 
of Rights. Moreover, majority verdicts undermine the reasonable doubt 
requirement the right to a jury trial and the Court’s own case law prior 
to Apodaca and Johnson and since then, confirms this unanimous right 
to proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a component of the jury trial 
guarantee. Finally, current research shows that unanimity is essential 
to the purposes of the fair cross section requirement and complete 
deliberation required by the Sixth Amendment. Defense attorneys in 
Oregon (and Louisiana) should preserve their objections to 
nonunanimous instructions at the trial level to allow for eventual 
review by both the state appellate courts and the Supreme Court. 
Beyond a judicial remedy to ending nonunanimous juries, the 
Oregon Legislature and its citizenry should vote to amend the state 
constitution to provide for unanimous verdicts. This is not evidence of 
being “soft on crime” but instead shows that the State takes seriously 
its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It further 
demonstrates to minority members of our community that Oregon will 
no longer support a rule that disparately impacts minorities. 
Additionally, such an amendment to the state constitution would show 
a commitment to protecting innocent defendants. Oregon district 
attorneys should support such a change in the law, as prosecutors have 
a special ethical responsibility as “a minister of justice and not simply 
that of an advocate.”354 This requires a prosecutor to ensure the 
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“defendant is accorded procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the 
basis of sufficient evidence, and that special precautions are taken to 
prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent persons.”355 
Unanimous jury verdicts ensure that the State meets its burden of proof 
in the few criminal cases that proceed to trial. 
Finally, Oregonians should learn about the nonunanimous verdict 
requirement and how it affects jury verdicts in the state. A surprising 
number of Oregonians are not aware that we allow ten members of a 
twelve-person jury to convict a criminal defendant. Even if a reader 
disagrees with the conclusions reached in this Article, discussion 
regarding criminal justice system reform policies will both help protect 
innocent defendants from being wrongfully convicted and move 
Oregon past its discriminatory history. 
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